Two-Theater War

Also known as two-major-theater war (2MTW), or major regional conflicts (MRCs), a defense-planning construct used to estimate the size and composition of U.S. forces necessary for optimal military readiness at any given time. The two-theater-war concept holds that the United States should be capable of simultaneously fighting two major conflicts in different parts of the world.

During the administrations of Presidents John F. Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson, the Defense Department used a two-and-one-half strategy—the ability to fight two major wars and one limited conflict simultaneously. In the 1960s, this paradigm referred to the ability to confront a Soviet attack in Europe, a Chinese attack somewhere in Asia, and a minor conflict in Cuba.

Fiscal constraints and the war in Vietnam led to a one-and-one-half concept during the 1970s. During the late 1970s and 1980s, President Jimmy Carter used the measure of multitheater war, with the Soviet Union in Europe and the Persian Gulf, and the administration of President Ronald Reagan sized U.S. forces on the basis of an all-out global war with the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies (an idea known as the Illustrative Planning Scenario). The administration of President George H. W. Bush used a base-force concept built on general capabilities rather than planning based on specific scenarios.

The two-theater-war force-planning mechanism was adopted in 1993 by the administration of President Bill Clinton, and it referred to the readiness to concurrently fight a large, offensive ground war in the Persian Gulf (most likely against Iraq) and another war on the Korean peninsula (against North Korea).

Critics of the two-major-theater-war criterion cite the problem of planning as if one were “fighting the last war.” They stress the changing nature of threats to U.S. national security—such as terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction among smaller states, and an emerging China. As a result, emphasis is now usually placed on lighter, more flexible, and more mobile rapid-response forces.

The administration of President George W. Bush laid out a slightly modified two-theater-war concept in the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review. The requirement for the United States to be able to simultaneously fight a war in two critical areas was maintained, and U.S. forces were expected to be able to win decisively in one of those conflicts. A decisive victory is defined as including the potential for territorial occupation and regime change if necessary. Defense of the homeland, forward deterrence in four critical regions of the world (Europe, Northeast Asia, the East Asian littoral, and the Middle East and Southwest Asia), and planning for smaller-scale contingency operations forms part of the new force-sizing construct articulated in the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review.