Tet Offensive

Attack staged by North Vietnamese forces, beginning in the early hours of January 31, 1968, during the Vietnam War. The Tet Offensive consisted of simultaneous attacks by 85,000 troops under the direction of the North Vietnamese government. The attack was carried out against five major South Vietnamese cities, dozens of military installations, and over 150 towns and villages throughout South Vietnam. The offensive derives its name from the Vietnamese New Year holiday—Tet—during which the attacks occurred.

In the fall of 1967, the communist Vietcong decided to gamble upon a course of action that would ideally break the stalemate between the United States and North Vietnam. This course of action consisted of a series of widespread and repeated attacks on South Vietnam. For the North Vietnamese government, the best result would be a galvanizing of discontent in the South that would, in turn, enforce the collapse of America's ally, the government and army of South Vietnamese leader Nguyen Van Thieu. The least optimistic result would be convincing the United States that it could not win the war. Many Americans did believe this by the third day of the Tet Offensive attacks.

The Tet Offensive has been seen by many as the turning point in the war. By February of 1968, the U.S. death toll in Vietnam had risen to more than 500 per week. As the death toll rose, U.S. public support declined. Much of the American public viewed the Tet Offensive as a sign of the undying North Vietnamese aggression and will. The place of the U.S. media in fostering and furthering this belief in North Vietnamese strength during that period has been a topic of study and argument.

Whatever the impetus, the American public grew increasingly vehement in its opposition to the continued presence of U.S. solders in Vietnam, and the gulf between what the military saw as the most effective means of fighting the war became even larger from the inevitably politically driven administration.

On March 10, 1968, the New York Times ran a story under the headline “Westmoreland Requests 206,000 More Men, Stirring Debate in Administration.” This request galvanized the public and convinced them that, rather than a Vietnamization of the conflict, America's involvement was increasing at the cost of American lives in the face of an unfaltering and seemingly unbeatable enemy.

The military, however, unlike the American public, had grown more optimistic following the Tet Offensive. They saw a successful rebuke of the enemies' attacks and an undeniable weakening of communist forces and strength, for the communist forces had suffered heavy casualties. General William C. Westmoreland viewed the post-Tet situation as an opportunity for an American offensive and expansion of the conflict on the ground, to further debilitate the enemy and deny any future resurgence. He renewed a former request for more troops, with the encouragement of the Joint Chiefs of Staff chairman, General Earle Wheeler. His request was initially denied, however—President Johnson did not desire any expansion of the ground war.

Increasingly vocal antagonism against any escalation of U.S. involvement in Vietnam put greater pressure on the Johnson administration and the U.S. Congress. In mid-March, 139 members of the House of Representatives sponsored a resolution asking for congressional review of U.S. policy in Vietnam. Secretary of State Dean Rusk was called before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and questioned for 11 hours. On March 22, President Johnson decided upon only a small increase of troops. At the same time, the president announced that General Westmoreland would be returning to the United States in midsummer to become chief of staff of the army.

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