Political Assassination

The purposeful killing of foreign political or military leaders. Although political assassination is prohibited by executive order, the United States has attempted to use assassination as a policy tool in peacetime and in war. Longstanding moral objections to assassination also have made policymakers wary of using it as a weapon of foreign policy. However, contemporary trends in international politics, especially the rise of terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, suggest that assassination may become a more tempting policy option in the future.

The Use of Assassination in History

Until the beginning of the 17th century, assassination was widely accepted as a political device. As late as 1516, English scholar and statesman Sir Thomas More defended the ethics and practicality of political assassination. More was in the mainstream of thought; from the medieval period through the counter-Reformation (ca. 1200–1650), the practice of assassinating rulers or leaders was used with little reservation.

The Protestant Reformation and resulting Catholic counter-Reformation in the 1500s and early 1600s brought a religious dimension to politics that fueled the use of assassination. Monarchs during this time often viewed their foreign counterparts not merely as political rivals but also as heretics. Thus, King Phillip II of Spain, a Catholic, tried repeatedly to assassinate Protestant monarchs such as Holland's William of Orange and Queen Elizabeth I of England. The Vatican took part in such activities, as well, publicly supporting the assassination of Elizabeth.

Political and legal theorists began to codify the prohibition on assassination in the late 16th and 17th centuries. Anticipating the approach of the nation-state, Italian jurist Alberico Gentili wrote in 1598 that European leaders who used assassination might find it used against themselves. He also tied public security to the safety of public leaders. The rise of the nation-state system in the mid-17th century introduced a new norm against political assassination. Because the state system was defined by its political leaders, international order depended on mutual respect for their lives. Because the Great Powers each had an interest in maintaining the existing political order, this tacit agreement reduced the likelihood of any established state resorting to assassination, thus promoting the safety of all their leaders. Assassination remained a domestic problem, but it rapidly declined as a tool of foreign policy.

In the mid-1700s, Swiss legal scholar Emmerich de Vattel gave voice to the prevailing view of assassination. [Page 583]De Vattel expressed revulsion at the “infamous and execrable” practice of assassination and warned policymakers that any leader who resorted to killing political rivals would be “regarded as an enemy of the human race.” At roughly the same time, on the other side of the Atlantic Ocean, Thomas Jefferson wrote that assassination was a product of the Dark Ages, and he applauded civilization for moving forward.

Despite these strong condemnations of assassination, scholars disagree on the historical strength of the norm against political killing. Those who feel that the norm largely has been upheld point out that state-supported international assassination virtually disappeared by the 19th century. Other scholars contend that leaders weigh many factors in making decisions, and that assassination simply came to be seen by decision makers as a less effective political tool. They argue that the apparent norm against assassination was nothing more than a decision to choose options perceived to be better.

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