Nuclear Deterrence

Strategy aimed at preventing war by maintaining a sufficient nuclear arsenal to dissuade a similarly armed adversary from initiating an attack for fear of a destructive retaliation. Nuclear deterrence is a strategic policy implemented to make the cost of going to war too high for a country to instigate conflict because the potential response would be devastating. The necessary component in deterrence strategy is to maintain a credible capability to balance the adversaries' own resources.

In early August 1945, the Little Boy and Fat Man atomic bombs were dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in Japan, thereby introducing the nuclear weapon into modern warfare. The advent of this new technology coincided with the beginning of the Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union. As nuclear weapon proliferation by these two super-powers increased, strategic policies likewise began to incorporate the nuclear component.

Traditionally, strategic policy focused on conventional deterrence. This included bolstering the size and capability of the armed forces, developing new weapons technology, and augmenting defense capabilities to deter opponents' aggression. During the Cold War, however, strategic policy began to integrate a nuclear deterrent to reinforce the conventional military capability.

Beginning in 1950, this change was reflected in U.S. strategic policy with the National Security Council Report 68 (NSC-68), which recognized the threat of a nuclear-armed Soviet Union. In 1954, in response to the potential Soviet threat, the United States formulated its nuclear deterrence policy in [Page 533]terms of massive retaliation. This policy asserted the United States' right to respond to aggression with massive retaliatory force.

During the 1960s and 1970s, however, the United States clearly possessed a superior strategic nuclear capability, and massive retaliation was replaced by assured destruction, a policy that reflected the U.S. advantage. Assured destruction became the guiding deterrent policy. It was predicated on the ability to absorb a first strike from the Soviets and have a subsequent capability to retaliate with unacceptable damage on the Soviets. Unacceptable damage was defined as destroying more than one-third of the population, two-thirds of Soviet industry, and more than 200 Soviet cities.

Two key elements of the assured destruction capability included survivability and flexible response. The survivability aspect describes a nuclear weapons system capable of absorbing a nuclear strike and still being able to function at sufficient strength to retaliate. Flexible response includes possessing a triad of nuclear delivery options—by land, air, and sea. This versatility bolstered the nuclear deterrent, enabling the dispersal of attack options.

During the 1970s, the Soviets significantly increased their nuclear arsenal, and U.S. strategic nuclear superiority diminished. The United States therefore modified its deterrent policy to reflect this reality in the way of mutually assured destruction (MAD). MAD was based on both countries possessing a significant second-strike capability to retaliate and inflict unacceptable damage on the adversary following a first strike.

Currently, advances in technology have significantly improved the precision of nuclear warhead delivery methods and subsequently altered some elements of nuclear deterrence. Whereas with massive retaliation, assured destruction, and MAD, targeting was aimed at countervalue elements—including enemy population centers, industries, and resources. Modern technology has facilitated a transition to counterforce targeting, which is directed at destroying enemy military infrastructure and capabilities.

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