Non- and Counterproliferation

Efforts to slow or prevent the spread of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) to decrease the risk of such weapons being used in an armed conflict. Nonproliferation and counterproliferation policies are based on the assumption that the proliferation of these types of weapons increases the threat of war, amplifies the destructiveness of war, and raises the costs of preparing for war.

Nonproliferation regimes include treaties, sets of international organizations, and the states that subscribe to them. For example, the nuclear nonproliferation regime consists of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), parts of the United Nations, and the states that subscribe to the NPT. Nonproliferation regimes also exist for chemical and biological weapons and for their delivery systems, notably missiles.

By contrast, counterproliferation policies, such as those advanced by the United States, are intended to convince or compel states to discontinue weapons programs, by force if necessary. Counterproliferation policies can take various forms, including war (as in the case of the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq in 2003) or even negotiated aid packages (as in the case of the Agreed Framework negotiated with North Korea in 1994).

Despite these varied approaches for slowing proliferation, nonproliferation regimes and counterproliferation policies often work in tandem to achieve the common goal of halting the spread of WMD. This was the case from 1991 to 1999 with the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM), which combined both approaches in preventing Iraq from continued development of WMD.

Nonproliferation and the Cold War

During the Cold War, efforts by individual states and the UN to slow the spread of WMD focused primarily on the nonproliferation of the nuclear weapons through multilateral and bilateral agreements. Many countries believed that proliferation would end if the nuclear states agreed not to share nuclear weapons technology with nonnuclear states. Despite this widespread belief, the creation of an international nonproliferation treaty regime actually was quite complicated and required extensive international bargaining.

The creation of the IAEA in 1957 was the first cooperative response to controlling the proliferation of nuclear technology for weapons use. Six years later, the Limited Test Ban Treaty was signed, prohibiting nuclear weapons tests in the atmosphere, in outer space, and under water. The NPT, which entered into force in 1970, marked the most significant international cooperative prohibition on the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

The treaty forbids nonnuclear weapons member-states from manufacturing, controlling, or receiving the transfer of nuclear weapons. It also prohibits nuclear [Page 524]weapons member-states from assisting them in developing nuclear technology for weapons purposes. Article VI of the NPT requires the five certified nuclear weapons member-states—the United States, Great Britain, France, Russia (the former Soviet Union), and China—“to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament.”

Bilateral U.S.-Soviet talks during the Cold War showed that both parties wanted to slow nuclear proliferation. These talks led to negotiation of the Antiballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty and the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT I and SALT II) in the 1970s. However, the independent development of nuclear weapons by France and China in the 1960s demonstrated the possibility that states could acquire nuclear weapons without the assistance of others. The later development of nuclear weapons by non-NPT signatories India, Pakistan, and Israel revealed that the uncontrolled spread of nuclear weapons would likely continue, despite the best efforts of international regimes to prevent it. Moreover, the use of chemical weapons in the Iran-Iraq war (1980–1989) highlighted the fact that international nonproliferation regimes could no longer focus solely on nuclear weapons.

...