Nixon Shocks

Policies initiated by the administration of U.S. President Richard Nixon that challenged the prevailing strategic and economic relationship between the United States and Japan. This account traces events leading up to and culminating in the Nixon Shocks. Although not all of these events directly impacted the decisions that produced the Nixon Shocks, they offer a context for understanding the political atmosphere that shaped important international policies of the Nixon administration.

U.S.-Japanese Relations

Following its victory over Japan in World War II, the United States forged a security relationship with Japan based on containment of Chinese communism in Asia. In 1951, the two nations signed the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, which allowed the United States to maintain armed forces in and about Japan to deter any armed attack against that nation. The treaty was signed in the expectation that Japan would increasingly assume responsibility for its own defense against direct and indirect aggression by outside powers. In addition to this security arrangement, a strong dollar and open American market served as engines driving Japan's economic growth.

Strategic Issues and the Okinawa Question

By the time Nixon took office in 1969, the Soviet Union was approaching strategic military parity with the United States, and economic policies pursued by Western Europe and Japan threatened American prosperity. By 1971, ballooning trade and balance of payments deficits eroded faith in the dollar and reduced Washington's global influence. By the spring of 1971, foreign pressure to redeem dollars for gold reached a climax. For the first time since World War II, American global economic interests collided with those of the European allies and Japan. Facing an economic crisis unprecedented since 1945, Nixon was forced to introduce the New Economic Policy, which economically and strategically hurt its chief Asian ally at the time, Japan.

In March 1969, Japanese Prime Minister Eisaku Sato told the Japanese Diet (parliament) that he intended to make the return of a nuclear weapons-free Okinawa the first issue of business with President Nixon. The American government considered the Okinawa bases to be of inestimable value, not just for the ongoing U.S. operations in Vietnam but also for the U.S. strategic position in the Pacific. Japanese-American negotiations over Okinawa began in earnest in June 1969 and continued through the Nixon-Sato summit that November.

The two sides tacitly agreed on several points that, although not legally binding, went beyond previous [Page 521]commitments. The United States agreed to withdraw its nuclear weapons from Okinawa and return the island to Japanese control. In return, Japan would allow the United States to use existing military Okinawa bases for a wider variety of combat operations against Vietnam than other bases in Japan. The Japanese also agreed to adopt a “positive attitude” toward the use of U.S. bases in Japan to defend South Korea and Taiwan.

The Nixon Doctrine

As the diplomats worked on the details of the Okinawa deal, Nixon took a lengthy trip though Asia. On July 25, at a press briefing in Guam, the president issued a statement on future security policy that his aides soon dubbed the Nixon Doctrine. In his speech, Nixon pledged to honor existing security pacts with Asian nations and promised to provide material support to resist aggression. However, he also stressed that Asian nations must take primary responsibility for their own defense.

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