Missile Gap

Belief by U.S. officials during the late 1950s and early 1960s that the United States trailed the Soviet Union in ballistic missile technology. Following the Soviet testing of two intercontinental ballistic missiles [Page 471](ICBMs) in August 1957 and the successful launch of Sputnik in October, the United States began to believe that the Soviet Union possessed superior missile capability. Moreover, U.S. military and intelligence agencies projected that the Soviet Union would likely significantly improve its missile capabilities relative to U.S. capabilities. Members of the administration of President Dwight D. Eisenhower feared that if the United States did not reassess its nuclear posture and regain a comparative advantage in weapons capability, it would not be able to defend against a Soviet missile attack.

Fears of a missile gap were further exacerbated by a report issued by an ad hoc civilian group, the Gaither Committee, in November 1957. The Gaither Report gave a comparative analysis of U.S. and Soviet weapons capabilities and presented policy proposals. The report emphasized the potential difficulties of maintaining the U.S. second-strike capability and indicated that a Soviet attack could best be deterred if the United States possessed a force that could survive an attack and then strike back. U.S. nuclear strategy could no longer be built around its superior weapons capability and destructive capacity. Instead, the report proposed that the United States alter its strategy to develop an invulnerable force capable of massive retaliation. The report concluded that to achieve this strategy, the defense budget had to increase significantly, and weapons production needed to accelerate.

President Eisenhower was adamant, however, about reducing security expenditures under his New Look program. This fueled public debate about whether the administration was allocating enough funds toward closing the missile gap.

When President John F. Kennedy took office in 1961, his administration acted quickly to fulfill its promise to rebuild America's defense forces. Members of the administration soon learned that the perceived missile gap did not, in fact, exist. Moreover, if a gap did exist, it was in favor of the United States. Nonetheless, intelligence reports and assessments from the air force's Strategic Air Command (SAC) pressured the administration to accelerate the deployment of new U.S. missiles. The agencies argued that a more flexible response strategy would ensure that the United States could effectively react to a range of aggression.

Based on the recommendations made by Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, the administration moved away from Eisenhower's policy of massive retaliation toward a deterrence policy of mutually assured destruction (MAD). Under this policy, the United States expanded its nuclear arsenal to ensure that it could survive a Soviet attack and still launch a counterstrike that would destroy the Soviet Union.