Iraq War of 2003

Unilateral U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003 that produced vigorous debate in an already polarized diplomatic [Page 379]and American political landscape. Although the military defeat of Iraq remained a foregone conclusion, the drawn-out political and diplomatic deliberations in the run-up to the war have defied most simplified analyses, and the ultimate outcome of the war remains unknown.

Many observers fear that Iraq has become a possible repeat experience of the Vietnam War for the United States, but one must look further back in time, to the Spanish-American War, for an example of a military victory so easily won, followed by a confounding insurrection of the apparently liberated peoples. The Iraq campaign of 2003 (the third Gulf War) nevertheless met the timely needs of the U.S. political leadership.

The Approach to War

The advisers to U.S. president-elect George W. Bush had already made clear before the 2000 national election that the Iraqi question required a termination in U.S. diplomacy. Maintaining the U.S.-led aerial reconnaissance of the northern and southern no-fly zones in Iraq from Turkish and Saudi bases—a sanction imposed on Iraq after the previous Gulf War (1990–91)—cost too much in funds, equipment, and increasingly scarce military manpower. The forces could be best used elsewhere.

Moreover, the erstwhile allies of the coalition that defeated Iraq in the earlier Gulf War had grown far less determined to continue UN sanctions and embargoes that followed the conclusion of that war. Several of these nations openly anticipated the resumption of trade relations, with an oil-rich marketplace beckoning customers not too tainted from the Gulf War of 1990–91.

Meanwhile, Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein had defiantly resisted and obstructed the efforts of UN weapons-inspection teams monitoring the disarmament clauses of the 1991 armistice. In a manner still unexplained to date, Iraq withheld remaining details of the creation and disbanding of its ballistic missile, chemical, and biological weapons programs, as well as its research in nuclear weapons. Also, Iraqi army exercises had presented threatening moves toward the Kuwaiti border several times in the 1990s, leading to more extensive U.S. deployments to provide for local dissuasion in the Gulf region.

Thus, with the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks against New York City and Washington, DC, the Bush administration had already begun its deliberations on how best to put an end to the seemingly endless defense drain posed by Saddam Hussein's regime. Even as the quick military campaign against Afghanistan in the fall of 2001 to destroy terrorist bases of operations took shape, U.S. deployments and war-planning efforts against Iraq could be discerned. In the eyes of the Bush administration, if a war on terrorism had begun, then states sponsoring terrorism or known to sympathize with terrorist acts could be added to the list of likely targets. Paul Wolfowitz, the deputy secretary of defense, revealed publicly that the emphasis on Iraqi possession of weapons of mass destruction was hawked vigorously because the public would grasp it as a threat more easily than the other possibilities.

In his 2002 State of the Union address, President Bush spoke of an axis of evil and identified Iraq as part of it, thus setting the tone for a year of buildup of both policy and military readiness for a campaign against Iraq. The immediate objective was to overthrow Saddam Hussein and install a more friendly government that would ease tensions, isolate other opponents (such as Iran, also cited as belonging to the axis of evil) and permit greater U.S. influence in the region.

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