Information Warfare

A mode of warfare characterized by attacks on computing and communication systems. Offensive information warfare (IW) seeks to disable or deceive enemy operations by targeting electronic vulnerabilities. Defensive IW seeks to harden these systems against attack so that information flows freely among policymakers, commanders, and soldiers. Information warfare has implications for military confrontations as well as for homeland security.

Because the concept of information warfare is relatively new, definitions are inconsistent and sometimes vague. Nonetheless, analysts have developed two basic conceptions of IW. The first focuses on tactics that aim to cripple or deceive information systems. Whereas conventional weapons cause physical damage to adversary assets, IW influences adversary perceptions. It does so by obstructing communications, limiting situational awareness, or disseminating false information.

The second definition, sometimes called information-based warfare or information operations (IO), is broader. Information operations include all activities that influence the course of war by affecting the flow of information. Along with directed attacks on enemy networks, IO includes battlefield psychological operations (PSYOPS) and public diplomacy. PSYOPS work on the emotions of soldiers and civilians, in order to coerce them without having to use excessive violence. Public diplomacy bypasses normal diplomatic channels by communicating directly with foreign publics, usually through radio or television broadcasts.

Information warfare has evolved concurrently with information technologies. In the 1980s and 1990s, the growth of electronic networks greatly improved the efficiency of communications. More powerful microprocessors increased the speed of computing, as well as the amount of information that could be shared. These increases helped businesses and government agencies become more efficient. They also helped military organizations gain more immediate and comprehensive knowledge of the battlefield.

However, technological progress also created new vulnerabilities. More dependence on networked systems meant that, in theory, individual IW attacks could cause significant damage. Military planners began to worry that instead of attacking U.S. soldiers, enemies would strike military databases and control centers. By attacking these crucial nodes, adversaries might be able offset the United States' overwhelming conventional advantage. China, for instance, has already made IW a part of its military doctrine.

In addition to offsetting military force, foreign adversaries could damage U.S. economic interests by targeting commercial networks. Hypothetical attacks [Page 358]might also be lethal, such as an electronic assault on air-traffic-control systems. Some analysts worry that infrastructure networks are more vulnerable than military systems, because most infrastructure is owned and operated by civilians, who are less attuned to security threats. In addition, IT security firms work for private-sector clients and are not obligated to share information with the government. This arrangement means that security threats may go unnoticed by intelligence agencies.

The evolution of information warfare has created other dilemmas. Neither the Pentagon nor the intelligence community enjoys a well-developed method for IW threat assessment. Despite the horror stories that grab media attention, it remains difficult to gauge the effects of IW attacks. Consequently, it is hard to determine appropriate responses. Strategists also face an important trade-off between intelligence collection and IW. To illustrate this dilemma, suppose that U.S. signals intelligence collectors manage to tap an adversary's communications network. Information warriors might want to disable the network, but doing so would mean the loss of a potentially valuable source of intelligence.

...