Gulf of Tonkin Resolution (August 7, 1964)

U.S. congressional joint resolution (HJ RES 1145) made on August 7, 1964, that authorized President Lyndon B. Johnson to begin the American escalation of the Vietnam War. The Gulf of Tonkin Resolution was a reaction to two attacks by North Vietnamese torpedo boats on the USS destroyers Maddox and C. Turner Joy in the Gulf of Tonkin on August 2 and August 4, 1964.

The Gulf of Tonkin Resolution authorized the president, as commander in chief, to take “all necessary measures to repel any armed attack against the forces of the United States and to prevent further aggression.” It stated that the United States was prepared to “take all necessary steps, including the use of armed force, to assist any member or protocol state of the Southeast Asia Collective Treaty requesting assistance in defense of its freedom.” The Gulf of Tonkin Resolution was approved overwhelmingly by both the U.S. House of Representatives and the Senate.

The Gulf of Tonkin Attacks

The incidents in the Gulf of Tonkin that led to the resolution involved two different U.S. operations. Since July 31, 1964, the American destroyer USS Maddox had been in a DeSOTO patrol in the Gulf of Tonkin, the northwest arm of the South China Sea between Vietnam and China. DeSOTO patrols were reconnaissance missions carried out by specially equipped U.S. ships in international waters outside communist countries such as China, the Soviet Union, North Korea, and North Vietnam. In the case of the Maddox, the patrol aimed to intercept radio and radar signals emanating from North Vietnamese coastal defense stations.

Around 3:40 p.m. on August 2, 1964, three North Vietnamese high-speed boats fired torpedoes and [Page 310]machine guns at the Maddox. The North Vietnamese believed, incorrectly, that the destroyer had supported South Vietnamese raids on the nearby islands of Hon Me and Hon Ngu the night before. Responding to the attack, and joined by aircraft from the aircraft carrier USS Ticonderoga, the Maddox destroyed one of the attacking North Vietnamese boats and damaged the other two. The Maddox, only hit by one heavy machine gun shell, retired to South Vietnamese waters, where she was joined by another destroyer, the USS C. Turner Joy. This was considered the first attack.

On August 4, the Maddox and C. Turner Joy began a new DeSOTO patrol along the North Vietnamese coast. At 7:40 a.m., the latter ship reported an imminent attack by unidentified vessels. For roughly two hours, the ships fired on radar targets. The Ticonderoga launched fighter aircraft to assist the Maddox and the C. Turner Joy. This was the second attack.

The exact details regarding the two incidents are still controversial. Although evidence suggested that the first attack did happen, it is unclear whether the second actually occurred. On August 2, the USS Maddox was fired on, and the crew retrieved a North Vietnamese shell fragment from the deck, which was sent to the U.S. secretary of defense, Robert McNamara, and verified. However, McNamara claimed in the second edition of his memoir, published in 1996, that the second event did not occur. Instead, he claimed that he had learned of the attack during a 1995 meeting with retired Vietnamese general Vo Nguyen Giap, who denied that the North Vietnamese had attacked the U.S. destroyers on August 4. In 2001, it was revealed that President Johnson, in a taped conversation with McNamara several weeks after passage of the resolution, also expressed doubt that the attack had ever occurred.

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