Détente

Easing of Cold War tensions among the United States, the Soviet Union, and the People's Republic of China (PRC) in the early 1970s. The impetus for détente was the surprise visit of U.S. president Richard Nixon to China in 1972. Nixon's visit was conceived as a move to outflank the Soviet Union, but the resulting political thaw between China and the United States convinced Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev to seek closer relations with the United States.

The foundations for détente were laid during the latter years of the Vietnam War, which had placed a terrible strain on both the U.S. military and its economy. At the same time, the Soviet Union was stumbling economically and felt its society falling behind, both militarily and in terms of its quality of life. In addition, developments around the globe indicated that the world order was shifting from one dominated by the United States and Soviet Union toward a system of emerging and competing regional powers. The U.S. difficulties in Vietnam, the growth of China as a regional power in Asia, and the dramatic recovery of Western Europe from World War II indicated that the superpowers no longer totally dominated the international stage.

Against this backdrop, the administration of President Richard Nixon saw an opportunity to recast the future of international power alignments. Within the administration, the prevailing view held that U.S.–Soviet negotiations had reached a decisive moment. An easing of superpower relations was in the national interests of both countries, but only if discussions concerned concrete issues of mutual benefit. In a departure from previous administrations, the Nixon White House sought to improve U.S.–Soviet relations based on the recognition of specific issues rather than on an objective to create an environment of general goodwill. Groundwork for improved relations, or détente, would be established in areas where U.S. and Soviet national interests intersected.

However, the larger diplomatic effort rested on a foundation of triangular linkage. This triangular diplomacy acknowledged the ascendancy of the People's Republic of China as a world power and recognized that a rift in relations between China and the Soviet Union could introduce a new dynamic to superpower competition. Convinced of an approaching multipolar world order, White House policymakers sought to leverage relations with one country as a way of gaining concession from another. China's counterweight in this model would provide the elements needed for a new balance of power. The theory assumed that the United States was moving from a position of dominance to one of partnership, but one in which it could still maintain its vast global commitments despite declining capabilities.

The Soviet Union, for its part, was facing challenges not only from the People's Republic of China but also from within its more immediate sphere of influence. Rumblings in Eastern Europe had not fully silenced since the quelling of the reform movement in Czechoslovakia in 1968. The so-called Prague Spring had unleashed various underground movements during a bleak period of repression, and the Soviet leaders at the Kremlin in Moscow were now hearing the stirrings of discontent at the doorstep.

...