Countervalue

In nuclear strategy, the targeting of an enemy's cities and civilian population with a nuclear strike. The goal of countervalue targeting is the destruction of an adversary's socioeconomic base. Countervalue doctrine is differentiated from counter-force doctrine, which targets the enemy's military-industrial infrastructure.

[Page 170]The targeting of civilian populations is associated with the condition of mutually assured destruction in that it destroys vulnerable “soft” targets and can wipe out entire populations. The targeting of cities with nuclear weapons and the possession of a secure second-strike aptitude are the requirements for mutually assured destruction and make up the core of the theory of deterrence. The theory of deterrence holds that neither side in a conflict can be expected to rationally initiate a nuclear war because both are vulnerable to retaliation and destruction of their civilian populations.

Countervalue targeting provides an effective deterrent to nuclear war if both sides have a secure second-strike capability. This means that both sides must have intact, operational nuclear forces after having absorbed a surprise nuclear attack, and both must be able to launch a retaliatory strike. This requires assuring protection of one's nuclear forces and launch sites and convincing an adversary that a sufficient amount of one's forces can successfully withstand an attack and still be able to retaliate.

Countervalue doctrine was emphasized in U.S. defense policy after counter-force targeting fell out of favor in the 1960s. Because a relatively small nuclear arsenal is sufficient to strike an adversary's civilian population, both the United States and the Soviet Union attempted throughout the 1960s and 1970s, with varying degrees of success, to reduce their nuclear arsenals. Countervalue targeting was seen as providing the most stable nuclear deterrent because its only possible outcome is suicide.