Counterterrorism

Measures taken to combat terrorist groups and reduce the threat of terrorist attacks. many of the military and diplomatic options that a country uses to deal with rival nations also can be effective in combating terrorist groups. however, there are key differences in the structure and political organization of nations and terrorist groups. these differences require governments to adapt their national security strategies to combat terrorism successfully.

Evolution of U.S. Counterterrorism

Prior to the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, the United States had no coordinated counterterrorism strategy. The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, the congressional committee that investigated the September 11 attacks, criticized Presidents George W. Bush and Bill Clinton for their failure to appreciate the nature and scope of the terrorist threat. The commission's final report noted that terrorism was not a top security concern for the U.S. government before September 11, 2001. Even though the Soviet Union had collapsed a decade earlier, U.S. national security policy continued to focus on Cold War concerns. Hostile states such as Iran and North Korea were still considered the main threats to U.S. security. According to Richard Clarke, former White House coordinator for counterterrorism policy, in early September 2001, the government was still trying to answer the question, “Is al-Qaeda a big deal?”

The commission's report found serious weaknesses in U.S. counterterrorism capabilities and strategy. The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) had limited ability to gather information about foreign terrorists. In fact, between 1995 and September 11, 2001, the CIA produced no National Intelligence Estimate on terrorism. Domestic intelligence gathering also suffered from a lack of resources and poor coordination. Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) agents who were assigned to counterterrorism matters worked separately from other agents, which limited their ability to share information with FBI colleagues. Information sharing among agencies was also poorly coordinated. Often, knowledge possessed by one agency was never communicated to others. Vital clues to the September 11 attacks were missed because different agencies held separate pieces of the puzzle and never put them together.

The report characterized military efforts to deal with terrorists prior to September 11 as outdated and ineffective. For example, U.S. air strikes against al-Qaeda camps in Afghanistan in 1998 did little to [Page 168]disrupt terrorist training. Before September 11, the U.S. government was reluctant to invade Afghanistan with conventional troops, but the military had few paramilitary or Special Forces units, which are better suited to attack specific targets in remote areas. Even after the United States invaded Afghanistan in response to the September 11 attacks, it still relied heavily on local Afghan forces to locate and capture terrorists there.

The United States' attempts to use diplomacy to combat terrorism were also plagued by difficulties. Despite economic sanctions and the threat of U.S. military action, the Afghan government refused to expel terrorist leaders or stop terrorist activities within Afghanistan. The United States was also unsuccessful in persuading its allies in the Middle East to help combat terrorist groups. For example, although al-Qaeda had extensive financial dealings in Saudi Arabia, the Saudi and U.S. governments never coordinated efforts to track and disrupt terrorist finances there. The September 11 attacks highlighted the disjointed nature of U.S. counterterrorism efforts and led to sweeping changes in counterterrorism policy.

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