Counter-Force Doctrine

In nuclear strategy, the targeting of an opponent's military and industrial infrastructure with a nuclear strike. The counter-force doctrine is differentiated from the countervalue doctrine, which targets the enemy's civilian population and cities. The counter-force doctrine assumes that a nuclear war can be limited and that it can be fought and won.

The counter-force doctrine was formalized in the context of the flexible response strategy articulated by Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara during the Kennedy administration. In response to the 1950s strategy of massive retaliation, which maintained that the United States would respond to Soviet aggression with an all-out nuclear attack, flexible response sought to give the United States more options in countering communist threats. Counter-force targeting was developed with the idea of limiting damage and protecting cities in the event of a nuclear war. The “city avoidance” principle was the driving force behind counter-force targeting, and the hope was that both the United States and the Soviet Union could establish some ground rules to be followed in the event of a nuclear exchange. The idea was to create rules for a limited nuclear exchange to prevent escalation to an all-out, general nuclear war.

The Berlin crisis of 1961 and the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962 created the sense that nuclear war with the Soviet Union was a real possibility. The United States wanted to be able to minimize costs and limit damage should deterrence fail. The idea was to reassure the Soviet Union that the United States would not target its cities and to give the Soviets an incentive to refrain from striking American cities. For counter-force to work, the United States would have to convince the Soviets that they would both benefit from fighting a nuclear war in these limited, structured terms. This implied a mutual understanding. The counter-force doctrine was also seriously considered in the context of a Soviet invasion of Western Europe. The United States wanted to be able to respond to a conventional attack against Europe (extended deterrence).

The main problem with the counter-force doctrine lay in its inevitable association with a preemptive first strike. A first strike aimed at an opponent's military facilities and weapons systems could effectively disarm the enemy. Counter-force presupposed that adversaries would agree to strike only certain restricted military targets to protect those forces needed for an effective retaliatory second strike (necessary for deterrence to work). The logic was that the country that absorbed the first attack would have enough military force intact to allow it to respond and strike at the enemy's military facilities. This would create a limited nuclear exchange.

[Page 167]The United States assured the Soviet Union that it had no intention of launching a first strike, but these assurances were not enough. Counter-force continued to be associated with an offensive first strike, not a defensive doctrine. It was hard for the Soviets to believe that the United States intended counter-force to be used only in a second strike. And for counter-force to work, the United States had to successfully convince the Soviet Union that it would not launch a first strike.

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