Containment

Foreign policy doctrine that formed the basis for U.S.–Soviet relations in the post–World War II period and remained in effect for much of the latter half of the 20th century. As a strategy, the policy of containment sought to restore the balance of power in Europe, curtail the projection of Soviet power, and modify the Soviet conception of international relations.

In 1947, an anonymous article appeared in the journal Foreign Affairs. Its author's name was simply given as “X.” The subject of the article was a policy option for dealing with the Soviet Union and limiting its expansion. This policy became known as containment, and its impact on international relations would be felt for the rest of the 20th century and perhaps beyond.

Although known only as X, the author of the article was George Kennan, a political analyst and a member of the U.S. diplomatic corps. In his article for the July 1947 issue of Foreign Affairs, Kennan wrote, “The main element of any United States policy toward the Soviet Union, must be that of a long-term, patient but firm and vigilant containment of Russian expansive tendencies.”

Kennan predicted that the Soviet Union would eventually fall apart if it could not “find outlet” for its authoritarian rule—a prediction that proved to be prescient, as the Soviet Union crumbled in 1991.

Kennan believed that the Soviet Union's fixed ideology and aging and sclerotic state apparatus constrained the system and held it captive. Thus, despite the Soviet threat to U.S. national security, Kennan viewed the Soviet system as fragile, and he predicted that if anything happened that disrupted “the unity and efficacy of the [Communist] party as a political instrument, Soviet Russia might be changed overnight from [Page 161]one of the strongest to one of the weakest and most pitiable of national societies.”

In outlining a policy of containment, Kennan never advocated direct military conflict to meet the Soviet threat or to accomplish a rollback of its geopolitical territory. Rather, he proposed psychological warfare using such weapons as overt propaganda, covert operations, and even economic assistance. Additionally, Kennan's containment theory advised the United States to identify and defend only its most vital spheres of interest, which included Western Europe and Japan. Kennan opposed the idea held by President Harry S. Truman of a “domino theory,” which required the United States to draw geographic lines against Soviet expansion not just with respect to the centers of U.S. strategic interest, but in the peripheral world as well.

Kennan maintained that the active defense of nonvital territories was not in the U.S. interest. He believed that expanding the theater of conflict beyond Western Europe and Japan would commit the United States to innumerable conflicts in which it had no real political stake, causing an incalculable drain on U.S. resources and its treasury.

Meanwhile, Kennan believed that the Soviets were acting in their own national interests as well. Those interests required the Soviet Union to have an adversarial relationship with the West so that it could demand sacrifice and allegiance from the Soviet people at the cost of personal liberties and a demilitarized economy. Kennan believed that this constant, fortress-like mentality would push the Soviet system to the brink at a far lesser cost to the United States if containment were put into play. Built into the strategy, too, were opportunities to allow the Soviets an honorable way out of the struggle rather than confine them to the sole option of warfare.

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