Coercive Diplomacy

The ability to alter another state's behavior using means short of war. The broader definition of coercion refers to any efforts to alter the behavior of a target state through the manipulation of costs and benefits. This may involve threats, sanctions, or violence.

The goal of coercive diplomacy is to achieve security or wealth through forceful persuasion without suffering the costs of war. Coercive diplomacy may involve deterrence or its counterpart, compellence. Deterrence means preventing a state from acting through the use of threats and promises. Compellence refers to causing another state to do something that it would not otherwise do. Most analysts focus on coercive diplomacy as a form of compellence.

Political scientist Alexander L. George offered a restrictive definition of coercive diplomacy: “efforts to persuade an opponent to stop or reverse an action.” George conceded that this definition only covers defensive uses of coercive diplomacy; it leaves out more offensive aims. Nonetheless, his emphasis on defensive applications is not accidental. Advocates of coercive diplomacy believe that states may achieve their goals without resorting to war, which is inherently uncertain and dangerous.

A number of factors influence the effectiveness of coercive diplomacy. One important variable is the perceived credibility of the coercing state, or the target state's belief that the coercing state will make good on its threats. The coercing state must carefully balance threats of punishment, rewards for cooperation, and reassurance that cooperation will be reciprocated. States have little reason to comply with coercive demands if they do not believe that they will be rewarded for doing so. Another factor is the balance of interests; coercive diplomacy is unlikely to work when the target state believes that vital interests are at stake. The character of the target state also matters—how willing its leadership is to accept risk, whether it cares about protecting its civilian population, and so on.

The Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962 is frequently cited as an example of successful coercive diplomacy. After discovering that the Soviet Union had secretly placed nuclear missiles in Cuba, U.S. president John F. Kennedy used coercive diplomacy to convince Moscow to remove them. Kennedy ordered a naval blockade of Cuba, which not only prevented the Soviets from delivering more missiles but also sent the Soviets an implicit threat of military confrontation. Kennedy also secretly offered to remove U.S. missiles from Turkey if the Soviets cooperated. After a tense standoff, the Soviet leadership finally dismantled the missile installations on the island.

Coercive diplomacy can also have offensive goals. In 1960–61, for example, the United States used a combination of military threats and economic sanctions to engineer a regime change in the Dominican Republic. By placing an embargo on Dominican sugar exports, Washington undermined the economic and political base of the Dominican dictator, Raphael Trujillo. The U.S. actions emboldened local opponents of Trujillo, who killed the dictator and forced his family to flee the island. Scholars continue to argue whether economic sanctions or military threats were more important to the final outcome. Whatever the case, the Dominican affair demonstrates that coercive diplomacy is not limited to preserving the status quo.

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