Selection

With the publication of On the Origin of Species by Charles Darwin in 1859, the concept of selection became the key for a new understanding of processes in general. Biological evolution is a process that relates variability (within and between species) to external conditions (environment) by selection. In the case of sexual selection, which does not refer to the struggle for existence, but—as Darwin puts it—to the struggle between males for the possession of the females, the role of the environmental conditions is complex, as there are many examples of sexually successful variations that carry no advantage regarding the survival in the environment. Both natural and sexual selection are not conceived of as acts of individuals but rather as results of a testing process: Is a certain variation of an organ successful with respect to certain environmental conditions or the chances for reproduction? Does it increase the chance of individual or generical survival? Variations, however, have only an evolutionary impact if they are hereditary.

The application of these evolution theoretical concepts on cultural and societal phenomena is historically burdened, since the so-called social Darwinism became the framework for racism, eugenics, and fascism in the first half of the 20th century. From a purely scientific perspective, this application runs the risk of reductionism offering teleological explanations for the existence of cultural forms of all kinds. For example, making music can be seen as an evolutionary reasonable behavior with regard to sexual selection (the sexual advantages of musicians are not only implicit but even thematic in popular music; playing the piano is almost a necessary criterion for the marriageability of the Victorian gentry). Concerning the struggle for existence, music can be said to perform valuable functions for the development of social and communicative behavior, which is a key to the success of a kin, a tripe, or a people. Modern evolution theories, however, emphasize the contingency of evolutionary processes, rejecting the notion that observable “results” of evolution are necessarily rational or useful.