Collective Action

The Problem of Collective Action

Collective action may be a one-time incident, such as the payment of contributions by members of a community to renovate their town hall, or a long-term process, such as participation in a decade-long struggle for the improvement of civil rights. Regardless of the duration of the action and the degree of commitment required for its sustenance, the main feature of collective action is that it rarely occurs in natural conditions. This problem is commonly explained through the logic of what is known as the Prisoners' Dilemma.

The Prisoners' Dilemma is based on the fundamental assumption that individuals are self-interested [Page 219]in the sense that they maximize utility. The following scenario provides an illustration of the concept:

To summarize, if Tanya and Cinque both choose to remain silent, they will both achieve the most positive outcomes. If both confess, they will face somewhat more negative results. But if one chooses to confess while the other remains silent, the one who remains silent will suffer the most negative consequences while the one who confesses will enjoy the most positive outcome. Although remaining silent seems to be the best choice for both players, the individuals are likely to end up choosing confession for two reasons. First, confession is the strategy that offers a better outcome regardless of the other player's choice. Second, due to the lack of trust, individuals choose confession in order to avoid potential exploitation by the other player. In other words, confession will be the desirable strategy for the rational, self-interested individual. The important discovery here is that what is in the best interest of the group differs from that which is in the best interest of the individual.

When the Prisoners' Dilemma is applied to a group setting (this is called the N-Person Prisoners' Dilemma), individuals will be reluctant to cooperate for similar reasons. Each individual will have the choice to either contribute or not contribute for a collective (or public) good. The best outcome for the group as a whole will be produced when all members of the group decide to contribute. Everyone will have paid the same cost and will receive equal shares of the collective good in return. But the best outcome for the individual, on the other hand, will be to not contribute and exploit the contributions made by other members instead, since through this choice the individual will be able to reap benefits without paying the cost. This phenomenon is called the “free-rider problem,” and it would be logical for self-interested individuals to become free-riders since their goal is to secure maximum gain. Consequently, individuals will be reluctant to engage in collective action for two reasons. First, the strategy of non-contribution offers a better outcome than the strategy of contribution. Second, individuals attempt to avoid possible exploitation by other players in the group.

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