Exclusionary Rule

The exclusionary rule, created by the U.S. Supreme Court, states that any evidence seized by government agents (usually police) in violation of the Fourth Amendment's protection against unlawful search and seizure is not admissible in an ensuing criminal trial. Although the exclusionary rule is not part of the U.S. Constitution, this issue of whether evidence obtained in violation of the Constitution could be used in court against a defendant was raised before the Supreme Court as early as 1886 (Boyd v. United States), but remained open to debate until 1914. Finally, in 1914, in order to enforce the mandate of the Fourth Amendment, the Supreme Court determined that prohibiting the introduction of evidence seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment, in a criminal trial, was the only way to deter law enforcement officials from future unconstitutional conduct. The development of the case law surrounding the exclusionary rule is tied to issues of federal versus states rights, because the early decisions pertaining to the rule applied only to cases in the federal courts. This created a dual system of exclusion until 1961, when the Court extended the rule to all state courts and to all law enforcement personnel, whether federal, state, or local.

Without the exclusionary rule, evidence seized by government officials was admissible in criminal trials, even if it was procured by constitutionally impermissible means. A police officer could enter a home, without a warrant or probable cause, in direct violation of the Fourth Amendment, and any contraband discovered during that unlawful search was admissible in the following criminal trial. A defendant could not have the evidence barred from trial, but could only seek other remedies at law, such as a lawsuit against the government agent, to recover damages for any injury sustained as a result of the agent's misconduct.

All this changed in 1914, when the Supreme Court decided in the case of Weeks v. United States that evidence seized by federal authorities in violation of the Fourth Amendment was inadmissible in federal criminal trials. The Court reasoned that this would deter federal agents from acting in violation of the Fourth Amendment by removing any potential benefit to the government from the evidence seized unconstitutionally. Federal officials would have to be careful, the Court reasoned, not to violate the Fourth Amendment if they knew that the evidence seized in such a manner would not be admissible at the subsequent federal criminal trial. The decision took into consideration the dual system of the U.S. government, with both federal and state criminal statutes. Federal crimes are adjudicated in the federal courts, while the state courts handle cases involving violation of state laws. Because Weeks did not apply to state officers or state courts, evidence seized by state officials, even if in violation of the Fourth Amendment, was still admissible in a state court criminal prosecution. Additionally, evidence seized by a state agent in violation of the Fourth Amendment would be admissible in a federal criminal prosecution, if the state agent turned over the illegally seized evidence to the federal authorities, as long as the federal authorities were not directly involved in the seizure. This became known as the silver platter doctrine because the states' agents gave the federal authorities the evidence on a silver platter. The Court's rationale was that there was no deterrent effect on unlawful searches and seizures committed by federal authorities by the [Page 650]preclusion of evidence seized unlawfully by a state actor from a federal criminal prosecution.

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