Crown Heights Report

In the summer of 1991, New York City suffered the most extensive racial unrest since the 1960s. On August 19, a car in the motorcade carrying Lubavitcher Rebbe Menachem Mendel Schneerson veered out of control and hit a black 7-year-old child, Gavin Cato, and his cousin. The accident set Crown Heights in Brooklyn, a mixed community shared by 20,000 Hasidic Jews and 18,000 blacks, on fire for 4 days. A rumor rambled that a private, Hasidic-run ambulance had removed the car's driver without attending to the injured children. The Cato children were brought to the hospital by the city ambulance, and Gavin was pronounced dead on arrival; his cousin survived his injuries. Anger [Page 126]exploded into outrage, and several hours later, a violent crowd of black youths, one of them Lemrick Nelson, attacked a 19-year-old Australian yeshiva student, Yankel Rosenbaum. Rosenbaum was stabbed four times and died in the hospital that night. Bottles were thrown at police officers and pedestrians, windows were smashed at shops and residences, cars were turned over, and shouting and fighting between blacks and Hasidim continued for several days without the active involvement of the police department or the city's administration. Forty-three civilians and 152 police officers were injured during these disturbances that spread over a 94-block area.

The administration of Mayor David N. Dinkins, New York's first black mayor; his City Hall advisers; and the city's police commissioner, Lee P. Brown, were criticized for not doing enough to stop the violence and allowing it to escalate to a riot. After Lemrick Nelson was acquitted in state court of Yankel Rosenbaum's murder and federal civil charges were brought against him, New York Governor Mario M. Cuomo issued Executive Order No. 160 in 1992, directing New York State Director of Criminal Justice Richard H. Gigenti to review the criminal investigation and prosecution in the murder of Yankel Rosenbaum. In 1993, a state investigative team consisting of attorneys, analysts, researchers, and police experts released a two-volume report titled “Report to the Governor on the Disturbances in Crown Heights: An Assessment of the City's Preparedness and Response to Civil Disorder.” Analyzed materials included official documents such as NYPD records and memoranda; logs; duty rosters; administrative guides; 9-1-1 tapes; complaint, arrest, and demographic data; newspaper and magazine articles; videotaped television programs; and interviews with 60 members of the police department, 40 Crown Heights residents, and 15 government officials. Gigenti's report addressed the following questions: How extensive was the violence throughout the riot? How prepared was the NYPD to respond to the civil disturbance? Were the actions of the police department and City Hall adequate? How effective was the 9-1-1 system in serving the public? What recommendations can be made regarding future preparation for responding to civil unrest?

Even though Mayor Dinkins accepted responsibility and blame for the riots at Crown Heights, the report determined that there was no evidence to support the charges that he or Police Commissioner Brown had instructed the police to let the angry black youth “vent” their rage and to not interfere. Still, the Crown Heights affair was a significant factor in Dinkins's failure to win reelection in 1993. Information that the disturbance was not “under control” and that the police were not acting effectively to end the violence should have caused the mayor to look closely at the situation and demand responses from top police officials.

...