Social Norms, Emergence Of

Regulatory Interests

The dominant approach to explaining norms suggests that they contribute to group welfare. Functional approaches, which were popular in the past, explained [Page 1393]social phenomena by suggesting that they were “good” for the group. Recent rational choice work, although relying on different mechanisms, also treats norms as solutions to social problems. This approach focuses on incentives. It suggests that when behavior produces externalities—that is, when it produces consequences not only for the actor but for others as well—those others have an interest in regulating the behavior. People want others to engage not in behaviors that hurt them, but in those that benefit them. When the consequences of the behavior and the associated regulatory interest are large enough, people will be motivated to sanction. Thus, for example, if cigarette smoke is sufficiently bothersome, an individual will prefer that smokers stop smoking and criticize them if they do not.

Both qualitative and experimental studies provide evidence in support of this view. Robert Ellickson, in his study of cattle ranchers in Shasta County, California, for example, found evidence that people enforced norms that contributed to group welfare. Experimental work similarly found that increases in the externalities associated with a behavior result in more sanctioning. While it is likely true as far as it goes, however, this approach does not explain all norms. It is easy to think of norms such as foot-binding in China, female genital mutilation in parts of Africa, and dueling, which do not appear to contribute to group welfare. Some norms seem to be damaging; others simply appear trivial. Furthermore, if externalities drive norms, people need to have information about the consequences of behavior. If researchers do not know what information people have and how they weigh the costs and benefits associated with particular behaviors, they will have a difficult time predicting norms.

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