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From the perspective of economics, the fundamental role of environmental law is to internalize externalities. Environmental problems are a case of market failure caused by negative externalities. A negative externality is a consequence of an economic activity of one agent decreasing the welfare of another agent if the market mechanism does not mediate this connection between the two individuals. The emissions of airborne pollutants generated by a production process and reducing the air quality in the neighborhood of the plant are among the many environmental examples.

Externalities destroy the ability of markets to provide for optimal allocation of scarce resources. The reason is that environmental resources are used free of charge by the generator of the externality. Thereby, rational agents do not appropriately consider resource scarcity when deciding on the quantity and quality of their economic activities. Compared with optimal resource use, people use too many environmental resources if they are free goods. The idea of internalizing externalities is to make polluters pay for the environmental resources they use. Ideally, the level of the prices paid should reflect the scarcity of these resources for society. An example for the possible legal strategies of internalization is environmental liability law. If polluters must fully compensate for any environmental damage they cause, they are induced to take the value of environmental resources used in their economic activities into account, just as they do with any scarce resource that has to be bought within the market system. With full internalization, the ability of perfect markets to provide for optimal resource allocation is restored. Consequently, environmental law may be considered to serve as an internalization strategy.

Environmental Law to Internalize Externalities

Pigouvian Taxes

The idea of market failure due to externalities and possible strategies for their internalization goes back to the work of the British economist Arthur Pigou (1877–1959). In his work on The Economics of Welfare, published in 1920, he developed the concept of making polluters pay by taxing their emissions. The appropriate form of taxation, later called the Pigouvian tax, is one with a constant tax rate per unit of pollution. The correct level of the tax rate is equal to the marginal damage caused by this kind of pollution in the socially optimal situation. The marginal damage is the damage done by one additional unit of the pollutant under consideration. The socially optimal situation reduces the pollution to a level where the difference between the environmental damage reduction and the cost of pollution control is maximized.

The introduction of the Pigouvian tax has been a milestone in economic theory. However, applying it to real environmental problems is difficult because it presupposes that the governmental agency deciding on the tax rate possesses a high degree of information, which is hard to get in practice. Particularly, the government must know the socially optimal level of emissions and the marginal damage caused in this situation.

Coasian Bargains

A competing idea to internalize externalities goes back to the seminal paper of Ronald Coase on “The Problem of Social Cost” (1960). Coase developed the idea of the polluter and the pollutee negotiating on the level of pollution. In contrast to Pigou's ideas, the state does not intervene by fixing a “price for pollution.” Instead, the state designs the framework within which private parties negotiate by defining and assigning property rights for environmental resources. If property rights are with the pollutees, polluters must buy permission to pollute from them. Under competitive conditions, and if there are no transaction costs, the externality is internalized via the payments polluters have to transfer to pollutees. Alternatively, if property rights are with the polluters, pollutees must compensate the polluters for any emission reduction. In this setting, the bargain also internalizes externalities. The reason is that by deciding to generate a certain amount of emissions, polluters forsake the chance to receive compensation payments for not generating this amount. Compensation payments forsaken constitute an opportunity cost of pollution. Coase has shown that the final amount of pollution generated in the equilibrium of these negotiations is socially optimal and does not depend on how the state has assigned the property rights. This fundamental result is now labeled the Coase Theorem.

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