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As distinguished from comparisons based on nineteenth-century novels or contemporary religions or medieval political regimes, a comparative legal study makes problematic what is apprehended as the law (although no canonical definition of this term obtains). Unlike investigations limited to aspects of municipal or international law, comparison of laws engages different (often national) laws.

Comparing Laws and Comparing Laws

Comparison is present whenever an author socialized into one law devotes research to another. It is made more visible if the research explicitly refers to more than one law. It is even more recognizable if the laws studied are made to enter into negotiation with one another. While no consensus has been reached about principles, methods, modes of problem specification, types of argumentation, forms of narration, standards of evidence, or techniques of verification, the historical and political fact of differentiation of laws provides comparative legal studies with its vital justification. The apprehension of pluralism as an enabling condition of thought and value supplies comparatists with a protocol of deterritorialized action emancipating them from the local law and foregrounding an interpellative ethics on which all structures organizing the relation between self-in-the-law and other-in-thelaw are made to rest.

Comparative analysis is a powerful political act: it not only ascertains “alterity” or otherness but also inscribes it to the extent that what the comparatist writes constitutes the other's legal identity (which, therefore, can be betrayed). This fact calls for the voice of the other-in-the-law to be allowed to be heard. Because the crossing of boundaries also means the violation of boundaries, it is important to accredit the discourse of the other by allowing the other to be as it is. The comparatist must come to terms with validity claims made and accepted elsewhere based on ontological-symbolic premises guiding statements and actions and taken as being either true or correct.

Throughout, in recognition of the semiotically complex cultural material underwriting denotational textualization, the comparatist must address the matter of linguistic practices of individuation and foster a means of acknowledging linguistic alterity. Since the disclosure of the other's conception of “governmentality” and of its underlying symbolic-ontological bases may allow the comparatist to uncover structures that run counter to the other's self-understanding, critical distance remains key. In any event, the comparatist can never gain access to the legal perspective “from within,” even through a strategy of “immersion.”

Beyond Positivism

Any comparative endeavor, because it must assume at the minimum two terms of comparison and a comparatist, requires to be envisaged as an interruption of totalizing thought. Like impressionism or cubism, like dodecaphonism or ragtime music, comparison is a practice of desublimation or defocalization. Through its stress on the discontinuity and localization of knowledge as opposed to the idea of a unitary body of “true” knowledge, comparison acts as a kind of schizophrenic not-all. Comparative legal study is possessed of a “contestatory” energy: vis-à-vis the national law, comparison intervenes as a break or transgression rather than an annotative elaboration. It is, in fact, the prevalence and vehemence of totalizing thought itself that confers on the act of comparison its disruptive rhetorical valence. Comparison of laws thus serves to highlight the contingent and specific character of rules, practices, and assumptions.

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