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The Coase theorem is among the most debated and most misunderstood concepts in the economics and legal literatures. It is at once the cornerstone of the economic analysis of law, an elegant demonstration of the problems with what Ronald Coase has called “blackboard economics,” and an illustration of the central hermeneutic tensions that affect even “scientific” analysis.

Originally coined by fellow Chicagoan George Stigler (1911–1992), based on an analysis of Coase's “The Problem of Social Cost” (1960), the theorem has been stated in several different ways over the years, and the different formulations have slight but not necessarily unimportant variations. Stigler's original statement of the theorem told us that “under perfect competition private and social costs will be equal” (1966: 113). A more typical statement of the theorem is that if rights are fully specified and transaction costs are zero, parties to a dispute will bargain to an efficient and invariant allocation of rights, regardless of how they are initially assigned. The basic thrust of the theorem is that judicial assignments of rights do not determine their final resting place in a world without frictions; rather, the rights will end up in the hands of those who value them most highly, via bargaining transactions.

A Pollution Example

A simple example will illustrate the theorem's mechanisms in action. Consider a situation in which a factory discharges pollution into a stream, causing $1 million in damage to downstream landowners. The polluter can prevent the damage by installing a filtering device at the cost of $600,000, whereas downstream landowners could eliminate the damage at a cost of $300,000. Efficiency clearly dictates that the pollution be eliminated, since the damage is greater than the cost of abatement, and that the optimal way of abating the pollution is for the downstream landowners to undertake the abatement since they can do so at half the cost to the polluter.

Suppose that the landowners file suit against the factory, seeking an injunction against further emissions. Suppose further that the court grants the injunction, thereby assigning the downstream landowners the right to be free from pollution damage. The polluter can abate the pollution at a cost of $600,000. However, recognizing that the downstream landowners can abate the pollution at a cost of $300,000, the polluter will be willing to offer them any amount up to $600,000 to undertake the abatement. The landowners, in turn, will be willing to accept a payment in excess of $300,000 to do so. Thus, in the absence of transaction costs, they will strike a mutually beneficial bargain that results in the landowners undertaking the abatement.

If, on the other hand, the polluter is given the right to pollute, the downstream landowners, faced with a choice between $1 million in damages and abatement costs of $300,000, will chose to abate the pollution. Thus, regardless of the initial assignment of rights, the efficient result—abatement undertaken by downstream landowners—will occur. The distribution of the gains from this exchange may well differ across alternative assignments of rights, as the assignment of rights can affect the relative bargaining power of the two parties. In the above example, the polluter bears the entire $300,000 cost of abatement in the former case, while that cost is borne by the downstream landowners in the latter case.

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