Animal Rights

The social and legal movement that asserts that nonhuman animals, as moral subjects or objects, are holders of rights dates back to the very origins of Western philosophy (for instance, Pythagoras, 582–507 BCE). The idea also exists in certain Christian thinking, such as that of St. John Chrysostom (347–407) and later St. Francis of Assisi (1182–1226). Today, it occupies a significant position in contemporary philosophical thought, especially in the neo-utilitarian current, which holds that animals are sentient beings and have the right not to suffer unjustly, and in neo-Kantian thinking, which argues that animals have an intrinsic value and must be treated as ends, not as means.

From the point of view of legal philosophy, the recognition of animal rights is based on the Golden Rule, which states that one should treat like subjects in like manner, at least with regard to their points of similarity. The theory of evolution of Charles Darwin (1809–1882) and more-recent discoveries in the field of genetics also provide the basis for underscoring elements of contiguity between species that lead logically to denying specism (discrimination on the basis of the difference of species). The argument is that discrimination cannot be justified adequately by the differences between humans and nonhumans. The tradition of species-based thinking is associated with the possession of a language faculty and the ability to rationalize, both qualities that animals also possess, albeit in a form unlike that of humans. In fact, not all humans possess these characteristics (in marginal cases).

From the standpoint of legal sociology, scholars argue that animal rights are claims based on interests nourished by the animals. These rights are identified by analogy with the interests that underpin the fundamental rights recognized as an entitlement of humans. One can trace these back to shared biological characteristics; at least the interest in preserving individual life, in the reproduction of the species, in freedom from suffering without adequate justification, and in a minimum quality of life corresponding to the ethological standards of each species.

As with fundamental human rights, these interests may be legitimized as moral rights, and thus declared [Page 68]to be legal rules, if they are supported by ideas that are shared to a sufficient extent by the culture of human beings. The animal rights movement argues that eating animals is ethically unacceptable, and it is opposed to raising animals as a source of food, especially in intensive stock farms. It also opposes the immorality and pointlessness of using animals for scientific and pharmacological experiments and for testing consumer goods destined for human beings (in the areas of foodstuffs, cosmetics, and so on). Finally, the movement opposes using animals as beasts of burden or to amuse people (as in the circus and zoos), including, for some advocates in extreme cases, their use as pets.