Stability

Defining Stability

Two primary difficulties confront us when we think more deeply about the meaning of political stability. First, while most journalistic and some academic accounts treat stability as a dichotomous variable, meaning that a given political system is either “stable” or “unstable,” on-the-ground reality is quite different. Only at the most basic level is such a dichotomy justifiable. For analytical purposes, however, there is widespread recognition among experts that political stability in the real world covers a very broad continuum. There are some political systems that are chronically unstable, with elections occurring irregularly (if at all), and in which the outcome of elections is often contested and likely to lead to mass protests, elite subversion, or both. On the other hand, there are systems in which regular, predictable political processes are almost always the norm. Finally, there is a wide range between these two extremes and cases of nations that fluctuate between stable, unstable, and everything in between.

Political science has recognized the continuous nature of political stability and as a result has accepted the wide variation in degrees of stability as an important variable to be studied in comparative politics and international relations. Indeed, there often exist regions within a given country that exhibit more stability than others. Far less consensus emerges on the normative benefits of stability, which leads to the second and more vexing challenge in coming to grips with the term stability.

Is stability a good thing, and if so, is more of it always better? Consider the argument in favor of a state of continual instability. This position was perhaps most strongly and dramatically argued by China's Mao Zedong. From Mao's perspective, China (and indeed all Marxist regimes) benefited from a state of constant revolution; in the absence of such revolution, bourgeois forces could threaten to reinstate capitalism. As a result, Mao plunged China into the Cultural Revolution in 1966, producing social unrest, violence, and purges. From Mao's point of view, however, and from that of the intellectual leadership of the Red Guards who held sway during this period, instability was to be institutionalized as the new “normal” in order to prevent the communist revolution from being extinguished. Only with the death of Mao and the arrest of the so-called Gang of Four in 1976 did this protracted, nonstop “revolution” come to an end.

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