Responsiveness of Bureaucracy

Responsive to Whom or to What?

How responsive do we want bureaucrats to be to those at the top levels of government? Might we also want them to answer to those they serve, their “customers,” in the language favored by recent reformers? Or to the norms and traditions of the organizations they serve? Or to external expectations that come from their professions—to the standards and norms of their roles as scientists, engineers, social workers, or related professionals? Or to some moral standards that are widely shared in the society? Or to the desires of those in the legislative branch of government, especially if they work in a separation-of-powers system, such as that of the United States?

When there is a clash between the demands of the many forces that affect bureaucrats and the orders of those at the top of governments, the situation becomes complex. The most extreme and, in a sense, the most straightforward to deal with is when government leaders demand actions that clash with common morality—mass killing, torture, depriving people of basic rights, and the like. There bureaucrats are looked on, at least after the fact, as heroes when they are not responsive.

Most situations are not so clear, even in retrospect. Bureaucrats in agencies responsible for protecting the environment may be pressured by scientific evidence on the one side that suggests the need for strict regulation of pesticides or of factory emissions and on the other by political leaders who oppose such regulation and interpret the laws in these areas in a way that preclude strict regulation. Customers or constituents of organizations may have preferences that differ from those at the top of governments, and they may be in a position to make life very uncomfortable, now or in the future, for those who do not respond to them. Bureaucrats who have been trained as scientists, engineers, or social workers may face demands from political leaders who would rather please an important constituency than follow a course recommended by scientific findings or the standards of a given profession. Legislators, especially in systems with strong legislative committees, may have different perspectives than executive leaders on what should be done, and these legislators may be quite influential because of longevity in office or the related possibility that they will be there long after executive leaders have departed.

Responsiveness Problems

Bureaucrats, especially those at or near the top levels of their organizations, have numerous resources that they bring to the relationship with politicians. They have the expertise gained through long service in a given area, supplemented often by specialized training prior to entering the civil service and training on the job and in programs designed to increase their knowledge. Max Weber, perhaps the most famous theorist of bureaucracy, put a great deal of emphasis on the power this expertise brought, and though those who study bureaucracy may debate the level of bureaucratic influence under various circumstances, few would deny it. Senior career civil servants have a great deal of knowledge about the history of their programs, the proposals that have been made in the past to change their programs, the constellation of forces that stand in support or in opposition to their programs, and what has worked or failed to work in the past. This is useful information to politicians, and they ignore it at their peril, but it also permits bureaucrats to help shape the agenda and to exert control over what is or is not done. In a real sense, bureaucrats responding to requests for information may make their nominal masters responsive to them rather than the other way around. This is a consistent dilemma for executive politicians seeking change.

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