Politicization of Bureaucracy

Institutional Politicization

Politicians have many means at their disposal for influencing and controlling the bureaucracy. These include administrative procedures, budget controls, [Page 2064]oversight, and prior review of agency action. The mechanism most commonly associated with politicization is staffing an agency with appointees chosen by politicians, usually in the executive branch; the higher the proportion of political appointees within the agency and the greater the extent of their penetration of the agency hierarchy, the more politicized the agency is. Thus, the United States Office of Management and Budget, with more than 7% of its staff appointed by the executive, is more politicized than the United Kingdom's Treasury Ministry, with only seven political appointees, or 0.5% of its staff. This entry focuses on political appointees rather than the other mechanisms of institutional politicization.

A politicized bureaucracy can be contrasted with one that is neutral, autonomous, or insulated—that is, one free from influence by the political branches and able to pursue its own agenda. Agencies may be free to do so by virtue of stalemates between political actors, each actor seeking to influence agency decisions, having cultivated a sufficiently influential constituency of its own, or monopolizing the information necessary for effective oversight. Political appointees within the bureaucracy can also be contrasted with careerists who enter the civil service and work their way through its ranks. This distinction is particularly important because careerists typically enjoy tenure, promotion, and salary protections. Careerists are thus not chosen by politicians. Rather, they are typically selected on the basis of objective measures, such as a competitive exam or special education (e.g., the Ecoles Nationale d'Administration and Polytechnique in France), and are insulated from politicians. This insulation should not, however, be overstated: Politicians can still influence careerists within many systems by offering transfers to prestigious posts and manipulating budgets.

There are two general motivations for institutional politicization. The first is patronage, where political appointments are created and filled as rewards to political allies or in exchange for favors. Patronage appointments are often “spoils” distributed by winners to those who aided in the campaign. The second is policy oriented. Politicians, usually executives, can politicize an agency to acquire greater control over it, staffing it with personnel of their choosing and whom they can dismiss. In this manner, politicization is a means by which executives steer policy. Similar reasoning informs the extent of institutional politicization when programs are enacted or implemented. If they anticipate losing political control, supporters of a new bureaucratically administered program may try to place it in an insulated agency dominated by careerists, whereas opponents may do the opposite, favoring increased politicization of the agency as a means of managing the program when they come to power. Similarly, a legislature faced with a hostile executive may prefer careerist administration of policy rather than politicization as a means of cabining the executive's influence.

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