Intergovernmentalism

Intergovernmentalism seeks to understand the reasons why states join together and to provide a realistic approach to the analysis of regional integration mechanisms. It tries to overcome the contradiction between Hobbes's vision of a competition among sovereign states and the modern process of regional and global integration. This entry explores how this concept emerged in connection with European integration and has been expanded to analyze forms of political and economic cooperation more generally.

Intergovernmentalism first found expression in the 1960s in the work of Stanley Hoffmann, who took a realistic view of the construction of Europe. Hoffmann, who taught at Harvard and Sciences Po in Paris, attempted to explain why states as nationalistic as France could bring themselves to give up certain sovereign powers in order to promote the common market, while at the same time opposing the strategies of the European Commission (EC). European integration cannot be explained simply in terms of the neo-functionalist spillover effect, according to which successful integration opens the way for new cooperation. Although it is true that Europe developed from an initially common, then enlarged market, the single market was only created when the political decision to set up a [Page 1231]single currency was made. Intergovernmentalism thus represented a criticism of both functionalist methods and institutionalist approaches. The former give priority to the process of integration, while the latter stress the significant role of institutions in governing interstate relations.

First, as regards the functionalist theories, it is clear that, as noted by Hoffmann, the interests of political elites do not necessarily coincide with those of the EC bureaucracy and that national elites may use their veto to block any transfer of power affecting their sovereignty; integration cannot be conceived of as a functional process that would be spontaneously built up, as postulated by functionalism. The Empty Chair Crisis, in which President Charles de Gaulle boycotted meetings of the Council of the EC in opposition to the EC's attempt to reduce the scope of application of the veto and increase the EC's own resources, and subsequently the Luxembourg Compromise that ended the crisis in 1966, deciding in favor of France and maintaining unanimity rule, symbolized this resilience of the state. Moreover, again in opposition to functionalism, not all sectors are integrated at the same rate. Some key matters remain within the exclusive domain of intergovernmental cooperation (the second pillar of the Public Environmental Center for Sustainable Development [PECSD], one of the constitutive pillars of the Union—as they were defined by the Treaty of Maastricht, which defied the European “architecture” in 1992—devoted here to defense and security), while others are governed by the simultaneous imperatives of cooperation and integration, as with the fourth pillar (economy and finance) in which the European Central Bank (in charge of integration) coexists with the Economic and Financial Affairs Council (Ecofin Council; in charge of cooperation).

As regards institutionalist approaches, intergovernmentalism suggests that international institutions favor negotiation by reducing transaction costs but that it is more effective in the technical fields of “low politics.” In “high-politics” areas of sovereignty, including the most prestigious prerogatives of a sovereign state, states endeavor to protect their powers and thus delegate them with the greatest parsimony. There is, therefore, a major contradiction between technical matters that could be fully integrated and the more political matters in which cooperation requires unanimous agreement and recourse to the veto.

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