European Integration

Introduction

European history over the past 2 centuries was dominated by the forces of nationalism, left–right ideological battles, and the militarism accompanying these clashes of belief. The principal vehicle of modern European history up until 1945 was the nation-state: a territorially delimited entity whose predominant collective self-understanding was the nation. In his seminal history of Europe, A. J. P. Taylor treated European states as personified entities with human characteristics: French arrogance, British aloofness, and German frustration. One of the driving forces behind European integration since the early 1950s has been transformation of the nation-state in Europe. Looking at how states of the EU relate to each other today, we see that nation-states have been replaced by member states. These member states are committed to cooperation within the institutions and frameworks of European integration, a commitment that raises questions about their own sovereignty. Certainly, national self-interest has not disappeared, and states still bargain hard with each other over matters of policy. However, the 27 member states are committed to finding an agreement often at considerable cost to themselves. They also delegate to the EU powers that were traditionally thought of as the prerogative of sovereign states.

The very purpose and character of this exercise has never been clearly spelled out, and the end goals of the integration process have remained shrouded in mystery. From the very start of the European integration project, ambiguity, obfuscation, and the prevalence of competing sets of underlying principles has been the norm. Successive generations of European leaders have been faced with multiple and ever-changing agendas for which there were no readymade solutions. Persistent differences among European actors concern the very nature of integration (federalism vs. intergovernmentalism) and the functional scope of integration (high politics vs. low politics), and at each stage a compromise between competing national agendas has had to be found. In this situation, pragmatism, incrementalism, and vagueness become operative principles, with the result that ambitious and straightforwardly cooperative projects have had a fairly good chance of being shot down. A good example is the European Defense Community (EDC) launched by the French government in the early 1950s. Opposed by both Gaullists and Communists in the name of a dangerous federalism that would see French soldiers come under the authority of German officers, the EDC was voted down in the French National Assembly in 1954. Unable or unwilling to overcome these residual currents of national sentiment, European policymakers were faced with a choice: integration in disguise or no integration. The language of successive cooperative arrangements had to be vague, and no specific destination point for the European project was ever officially proclaimed. Although some scholars and politicians talked about constructing a European federation resembling the United States of Europe, most were happy to see the EU as an “unidentified political object,” to use Jacques Delors's famous expression. Major decisions taken in the EEC and later the EU were thus based on a search for compromise and consensus rather than on any clearly articulated political principles or strategic end goals. The implications of this for democracy at the national level were never properly defined.

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