Election by Lot

The election of public officers by lots, or lottery, is a procedure that can prevent the formation of a permanent leading group and diffuse knowledge of public affairs among the members of the community. It can be an appropriate formula in settings in which an assembly of members or representative council makes decisions by broad consensus or unanimity, and public jobs do not require high technical skills. The selection of delegates by turns and the subsequent rotation of people in public offices can have about the same effects as lotteries. There is an old tradition of choosing public officers by drawing lots that can be found in ancient and medieval local democracies, modern private settings, and some international organizations. In most cases, it goes together with the central role of the assembly to make decisions on the most relevant issues, typically by consensual agreement, on the assumption that the identification of a common interest should not be too difficult a task.

The most relevant historical experience of selection of delegates, representatives, or public officers by lots was developed in Athens during the democratic period from the mid-5th century to the end of the 4th century BCE. On the basis of this experience, the philosopher Aristotle built his concept of democracy, which included the possibility of “ruling and being ruled by turns.” In Book IV, Chapter 15, of his Politics, Aristotle introduced a sharp distinction between the appointment of magistrates by lot, which was thought to be democratic, and their election, which was considered oligarchic. By democracy, he meant government by all the people, while election entailed government by an aristocracy consisting of the few best, which could lead to a perverse form of oligarchy. This classical criterion was taken up in the 18th century by the French provincial Charles-Louis de Secondat, baron de la Brède et de Montesquieu, who regarded suffrage by lot as “natural to democracy.” According to Montesquieu, the advantages of making choices by lot are, first, that it “is unfair to nobody, and [second, that] it leaves each citizen a reasonable hope of serving his country” (The Spirit of Laws, Book 2, chap. 2). Likewise, in Book IV of The Social Contract, the Genevan philosopher Jean-Jacques Rousseau highlighted the role of lots in an ideal democracy, in which, according to his Athens-inspired, assembly-based model, public offices should be considered “a burdensome charge,” and administrative acts should be reduced as much as possible.

The choosing of public officers by lots may have, thus, two types of advantages. First, by having this done frequently and establishing short terms of office, it can produce a high rotation of members in administrative or arbitral posts, thus preventing the formation and self-reproduction of permanent and closed elite, whether in the form of an economic oligarchy or a class of professional politicians. By replacing public officials frequently and opening public jobs to wide layers of society, no one can be blamed for making or implementing unpleasant decisions, but no one can be praised either. Only the assembly members remain ultimately responsible for the consequences of collective decisions.

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