Détente

Détente is a word of French origin meaning “a relaxation of tension.” In its traditional diplomatic usage, détente has most commonly been used to indicate a reduction of tension between two adversarial states. Détente has alternately been used to define a condition, a process, a policy, and a period of history. The concept is not synonymous with peace or a natural harmony of interests. In fact, a central element to any definition of détente is the precondition of intense tension and rivalry between two states with substantial conflicting interests. Détente, as Richard W. Stevenson (1985) proposed, might be best defined as “the process of easing tension between states whose interests are so radically divergent that reconciliation is inherently limited” (p. 11). Within that process, policies of engagement, accommodation, and cooperation may be pursued by adversarial states to reduce the tension created by their underlying conflict, which left unrestrained might eventually lead to war.

Détente first became part of diplomatic parlance in 1908 as the European great powers attempted to reduce the tension created by the then crises in Morocco and other imperial rivalries. However, détente is most famously associated with the foreign policy of former U.S. President Richard Nixon and National Security Advisor—eventually Secretary of State—Henry Kissinger during the 1970s. When Nixon came to power in 1969, constant threat of nuclear war and deep hostility of the Cold War had characterized U.S.–Soviet relations for more than 2 decades. To be sure, the real fear of nuclear catastrophe created by the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962 introduced an element of caution into the Cold War era and was perhaps the impetus for agreements such as the Partial Test Ban Treaty and the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty, but U.S.–Soviet relations throughout the late 1960s continued to be marked by suspicion and intense ideological rivalry. International conflict, such as the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 and continuing American war against communist forces in Vietnam, only heightened the danger of U.S.–Soviet military confrontation and possible escalation.

Nixon and Kissinger pursued détente in this strategic context. The first indication of the new U.S. approach to the Soviet Union and China appeared in Nixon's inaugural address on January 20, 1969, when he declared, “After a period of confrontation, we are entering an era of negotiation.” Furthermore, Nixon sketched a rough outline of the framework for détente when he invited the adversaries of the United States into a “peaceful competition” and proposed cooperation to “reduce the burden of arms.” The elements of arms control and restrained competition would come to be central features of the Nixon–Kissinger détente efforts.

The mechanics of détente were primarily left to Kissinger, who as Nixon's national security advisor centralized control of foreign policy in the White House under the auspices of the National Security Council (NSC). Circumventing the traditional foreign policy bureaucracy of the State Department, Kissinger established a “back channel” with the Soviet ambassador to the United States, Anatoly Dobrynin. This back channel provided an outlet for Nixon to communicate directly with Communist Party General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev on sensitive bilateral issues and during emerging crises. The origins of many of the significant U.S.–Soviet agreements and accords of the détente era can be traced to the Kissinger–Dobrynin back channel.

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