Democratization

Agency Factors of Democratization

The main theory with emphasis on “agency,” as developed in sociological theory, is the transition approach, which was proposed by Guillermo O'Donnell and Philippe C. Schmitter (1986) and further developed by Gretchen Casper and Michelle Taylor (1996). This agency approach analyzes the process of transition toward democracy with political elites as the main actors and as the crucial and critical factor of democratization. One of the conditions that help initiate a transition to democracy in an authoritarian regime is if the ruling elite splits into factions with opposing interests. This is likelier to happen in more developed societies whose complexity creates multifaceted regime coalitions that are not as easily held together. Rifts within the ruling elite are also more likely when there is a mounting legitimacy crisis due to economic setbacks, unfulfilled policy promises, and failures in crisis management.

In heterogeneous regime coalitions, legitimacy crises encourage elite splits because they create an opportunity for some elite groups to try to strengthen their position in the regime coalition by pursuing a reform strategy that they hope will bring them popular support, thus regaining legitimacy. Accordingly, many transitions to democracy have been instigated by the emergence of a reform camp within the regime. Typically, the reformers initiate a liberalization program that opens a space for criticism and alternative voices. As a result, opposition groups surface from the underground and, in many cases, advance further claims for democratization. If the opposition groups remain moderate in their methods (avoiding violence) and demonstrate their readiness for compromise but at the same time muster widespread public support, a negotiated transition to democracy becomes possible.

The emergence of opposition to a regime does not always result from an elite-initiated opening process. Sometimes, policy failures lead to spontaneous manifestations of widespread mass opposition, launching a legitimacy crisis that impels an intra-elite reform camp to surface and engage in negotiations with the opposition. Again, this configuration of events often leads to negotiated, or “pacted,” transitions.

The institutional basis of a given authoritarian regime is an important factor in this context because different types of authoritarian regimes show different vulnerabilities to democratizing pressures. For instance, the weakness of military regimes is that they lack an ideological mission that legitimates them on a long-term basis. Usually, they take power as crisis managers, so their justification is—often explicitly—only temporary. The legitimacy of military regimes is relatively easily questioned, either because the junta fails to manage the crisis, in which case its justification lacks credibility, or because things run smoothly, in which case the need for crisis management becomes obsolete. One obvious advantage of military regimes is that they control the means of coercion, so they can silence emerging opposition by brute force. But confronted with widespread mass opposition that proves resilient even in the face of oppression, the loyalty of the troops may erode if they are ordered to turn on peaceful protestors. On the other hand, even though military regimes sometimes exit quickly from power, they also easily return, as the repeated oscillations between military and civilian rule in countries such as Turkey, Pakistan, or Thailand demonstrate.

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