Democracy, Consociational

Consociational (from Latin, consociatio—close political and social interlinkage) democracy denotes a democratic political order in which political decisions are reached mainly by negotiations between political elites. Majority rule is not the dominant technique in decision making. Rather, political actors seek to find broad compromise based on amicable arrangement. Switzerland and the Netherlands are frequently cited as examples of [Page 554]consociational democracy. There is a variety of conceptual definitions of consociational democracy. However, consensus exists about the antipode. This is a majoritarian democracy in which elites eschew negotiations and compromise as soon they have a plurality of 50% of the vote plus one. The best known empirical illustration is the political system of the United Kingdom. Therefore, the antipode to consociational democracy is frequently labeled “Westminster democracy” since the British parliament resides in the Palace of Westminster. The political system of postwar New Zealand comes even closer to the ideal type of a majoritarian democracy.

The concept of consociational democracy is important for the comparative analysis of political systems since it emphasizes variations between forms of democratic government. This is in stark contrast to the traditional argument that English-speaking countries have a homogeneous political culture—that is, the actors share general orientations in the political system. There is consensus with regard to general political ends and means. This is a prerequisite of a stable democratic order. The more homogeneous a political culture is, the higher the stability of democracy, with the Anglo-Saxon countries being particularly homogeneous. In a nutshell, there is one form of democratic government, and the Anglo-Saxon countries are the best examples. In contrast, Continental European countries have a heterogeneous political culture. Subgroups such as Catholic groups, workers' movements, and the middle classes differ considerably in ideology and strategy. These fundamental differences are the germ of system instability.

However, postwar history demonstrated that, in deeply divided European societies, heterogeneity in political culture and a stable democracy are not mutually exclusive. The concept and underlying causal hypotheses of consociational democracy provided explanations for the political stability in segmented societies. Obviously, there are different routes to the Rome of democracy and consociational democracy is one of these variants.