Credible Commitment

Credible Commitment, Programming, and Delegation

At the heart of the problem of credible commitment is the strategic interdependence of two or more actors making sequenced choices. An example explored in the early 1960s by Thomas Schelling is nuclear deterrence. A stylized version of this problem is as follows: Assume that the Soviet Union moves first, choosing whether or not to invade Europe. The United States then responds to an invasion with either conventional or nuclear weapons. The Soviet Union's choice depends on what it thinks the United States will do in response. The Soviet Union's dominance in conventional weaponry would give it a victory in Europe if the United States restricts itself to conventional weapons. However, if the United States responds with nuclear weapons, the result will be a nuclear holocaust that is the worst outcome for both sides.

The United States would like to convince the Soviet Union of its willingness to use its nuclear arsenal. However, after an invasion, the self-interested choice for the United [Page 487]States is not to initiate a nuclear exchange. The self-interest of the United States diminishes the deterrent effect of its nuclear arsenal. Based on its assessment of the U.S. self-interested response, the Soviet Union can invade with impunity. Paradoxically, the option of making a self-interested choice works against the U.S.'s own best interests—thus, encouraging the very action that it would like to deter.

The United States would be better off if it could commit itself, prior to the invasion, to a course of action that would not be in its best interests later on. If it could commit itself to using the nuclear deterrent, willingly initiating a nuclear war in response to a Soviet invasion, then the best choice for the Soviet Union would be not to invade.

But how could the United States commit itself, prior to an invasion, to an action that would defy its self-interest in the event? One answer is programming of behavior. If the United States creates bureaucratic machinery that mechanically implements a nuclear response in the event of an invasion, then the Soviet Union would choose not to invade.

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