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Especially when thinking about its implication for identity and identification, the term mimesis offers a broad variety of meanings. In Ancient Greek, the mim- root (which had been present since the 6th century BCE) also occurred in mîmos —which signified both the actor and the role played—and accordingly, the verb mimeîsthai could mean to “mime” or “imitate.” Nevertheless, it also meant to act out a role or give presence to a character—and consequently the mim- root also appeared if there was no predecessor to imitate; for example, the role acted out could also be invented by a maker or poet (poietés )—and even musical performance could be said to be mimetic without talking about imitation of concrete sounds. Hence, the term mimesis also has implications of acting out, of embodying, and of (re)presentation; it thereby reflects both a tension between imitation and production and a tension between presence and absence. The relation of the latter tension to issues of identity becomes clearer when thinking about the stance one can have when facing a mimetic object. Four options are possible, which often overlap:

  • A mimetic object, observed from outside, is perceived as taking over an identity/taking part in an identity as present (e.g., the voice of a distant person realized by a telephone: one acts as if the person were partially/acoustically there, or as if her or his personhood were distributed into the medium).
  • A mimetic object, observed from outside, does not take over the identity as present (e.g., the same voice recorded by an answering machine).
  • A self corporeally realizes a form and takes over an identity (e.g., a child learns the habits of the culture into which it is born).
  • A self corporeally realizes a form, without taking over an identity (e.g., an actor playing a role).

Options 1 and 3 not only imply a production of identity, but also of presence; options 2 and 4 imply rather a semiotic difference of re-presentation. Mimetic realization can either be conceived as a mode of transportation/production of identity by producing a simile—or as a mode of signification/representation working by means of similitude. The phenomenon of mimesis hence raises all kinds of questions about identity-in-the-difference. In what follows, these issues are traced along the theories of Plato and Aristotle and then rediscussed along with current theories.

Plato's Concept and Critique of Mimesis

Plato, who was the first philosopher to offer an elaborated theory of mimesis, theorized mimetic objects and practices by introducing the concept of participation (méthexis ): In his view, any given thing participates in the idea of what this thing is. For example, a concrete triangle is a triangle only because it is a realization of the idea/principle of a triangle. This idea is about all possibilities of possible triangles—thus, it is only a limited realization; realization only takes part in the completeness of the idea. Nevertheless, the triangle can be recognized and defined only by having recourse to its idea; thus, the triangle has its defining being from it: The triangle is a triangle by being a part of —and taking part in— the idea of a triangle, so it has its identity from the ideal being.

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