Urofsky v. Gilmore

Facts of the Case

In 1999, six faculty members who were employed by public institutions in Virginia filed suit, challenging the constitutionality of a commonwealth statute. The plaintiffs alleged that the law violated their right to access sexually explicit materials on the Internet for work-related purposes and that it infringed their rights to academic freedom by denying them the opportunity to determine for themselves the topics about which they would engage in research and teaching. A federal trial court granted the faculty members' motion for summary judgment on the basis that the law violated their rights to freedom of speech, because it unconstitutionally infringed on their First Amendment rights by failing to provide sufficient clarity on the kinds of Web sites to which it was regulating access.

The Fourth Circuit's Ruling

On further review, a three-judge panel of the Fourth Circuit reversed in favor of the commonwealth. The court was satisfied that the statute was constitutional, because it regulated the speech of pubic employees only in their official capacities (and not as private citizens) as they addressed “matters of public concern.” The court explained that the speech of public employees involves matters of public concern and is entitled to First Amendment protection only when it addresses an issue of social, political, or other interest to the community, a situation that was not present in the case at bar.

Subsequently, the Fourth Circuit vacated the judgment of the three-judge panel, and in an en banc hearing (meaning that all of its members had the opportunity to review the dispute), again reversed in upholding the constitutionality of the statute. The Fourth Circuit viewed the faculty members' challenge as twofold. First, the court observed that the faculty members argued that the act unconstitutionally violated the rights of all state employees. Second, the court acknowledged that the faculty members claimed that the act infringed on their rights to academic freedom.

As to the first claim, the Fourth Circuit pointed out that the act restricted access to material that was sexual in nature only on public computers. [Page 520]Further, the court indicated that agency heads could authorize access to information on public computers if it was necessary to do so in support of legitimate research projects. In fact, the court commented that none of the faculty members had requested or been denied access to material that was sexually explicit. In addition, the court remarked that the faculty members did not assert a constitutional right to access the materials on publicly owned or leased computers for personal use, because they challenged the restriction on their ability to view Web sites for work-related purposes. Moreover, the court thought that the faculty members conceded that the law did not impact their speech as private citizens and that they were free to access the material in question on their personal computers.

...