Title VII

Congress enacted a series of antidiscrimination statutes in the 1960s and 1970s that were designed to combat widespread discrimination in the workplace. The most comprehensive of these laws, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, prohibits discrimination against employees and prospective employees or applicants on the basis of race, color, national origin, religion, and sex. Title VII applies to hiring, discharge, transfer, promotion, demotion, compensation, and “terms, conditions, or privileges of employment,” and also addresses other employment issues, including sexual harassment, maternity and religious leave, and retaliation for filing Title VII complaints. This entry reviews the general framework of Title VII in terms of the burden of proof required, the types of claims allowable, and the mechanisms in place for administrative enforcement and judicial relief. The entry concludes with a discussion of the application of Title VII to such specific discrimination issues as pregnancy, religion, harassment, and retaliation.

Title VII outlaws employment discrimination by both private and, since 1972, public higher educational employers with 15 or more employees. Under Title VII, colleges or universities can lawfully employ individuals on the basis of sex, national origin, or religion if such a characteristic is a bona fide occupational qualification (BFOQ) necessary for the institution's normal operations. For example, the Seventh Circuit upheld as a valid BFOQ a philosophy department's resolution that three faculty vacancies be reserved for Jesuits at a Jesuit university (Pime v. Loyola University of Chicago, 1986).

In addition to BFOQs, Title VII recognizes two other major exemptions that are relevant for religiously affiliated colleges and universities that are “in whole or in part, owned, supported, controlled, or managed by a particular religion or … religious corporation, association, or society …” (42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(2)(2009)). Under the so-

called ministerial exemption, Title VII allows educational institutions to employ individuals of their faiths. For instance, in EEOC v. Catholic University of America (1996), the Federal Circuit court for the District of Columbia refused to overturn the denial of tenure to a nun in the Department of Canon Law in part because her teaching responsibilities clearly fell within this ministerial exemption (Russo, 1997). In other words, because the nun taught canon law, a discipline that went to the heart of governance in Catholic institutions, the court refused to get involved in what it perceived as a doctrinal issue. The second exemption permits colleges and universities to employ individuals of the institutions' faiths if their curricula are directed toward disseminating their religious beliefs.

Insofar as race is addressed under the types of Title VII claims that may be filed, it is not addressed in a separate category; it is interesting that because complainants can bring race-based Title VII claims, White plaintiffs have challenged the employment actions of historically Black institutions of higher education, claiming that they were discriminated against based on race.