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Traditional economic theory assumes that the market for health services is characterized by an upward-sloping supply curve and a downward-sloping demand curve. Patients are assumed to be rational consumers who make informed utility-maximizing choices, while physicians are profit maximizers. The theory predicts that an excess supply of physicians in relation to the population will result in an outward shift of the physician supply curve, lower fees charged for services, and lower revenues. To avoid the loss of revenues, most economists believe that physicians exploit the information asymmetry (a result of patients' lack of clinical knowledge) in the market for their services and shift the demand curve up, resulting in higher revenues. This phenomenon is termed supplier-induced demand. It occurs when a physician has a financial incentive to recommend treatments whose medical benefits are outweighed by the costs. Supplier-induced demand is equated with unethical behavior because of the social welfare loss associated with inefficient treatment. Due to the prominent role physicians play in the healthcare industry, cost control measures will be difficult to implement under supplier-induced demand. By studying this phenomenon, policymakers will be able to design and develop relevant tools to minimize waste and improve access to healthcare.

Traditional economic theory predicts that when physicians have mixed patient caseloads (Medicare, Medicaid, and privately insured patients), a decrease in the fees charged to Medicare and Medicaid patients will result in substitution and income effects. Under the substitution effect, physicians will reduce their Medicare patient caseload and treat more privately insured patients. The income effect will result in the delivery of more services to both the Medicare and the privately insured patients to make up the income lost from the reduction in fees paid by Medicare patients. The observed increase in services to privately insured patients is consistent with both physicians' profit-maximizing behavior and demand inducement.

Why is demand inducement an interesting problem for economists to study? In addition to the waste involved, the existence of demand inducement contradicts the predictions of neoclassical economic theories of demand and supply, where the excess supply of physicians should lead to fee reductions. Proponents believe that if the market does not work as expected for physician services, the practitioners must be inducing demand. While this observation may be true, it does not consider the uncertainties involved in medical decision making.

The Demand Inducement Literature

Under the competitive model, physicians are expected to be perfect agents for their patients and should not induce demand for personal financial gains. An increase in physician density relative to population must result in decreased fees and utilization. Researchers have investigated the impacts of physician density, fee changes, physician monopoly power, and target income on the existence of supplier-induced demand.

Impact of Physician Density on Demand Inducement

The evidence of demand inducement using physician density has been ambiguous. Most of the researchers did not control for quality in their studies. If physician density increases, physicians could respond to market competition by differentiating the services delivered based on quality. Under normal circumstances, quality of care is an increasing function of time spent per patient during visits. Patients who value quality must be willing to pay more for higher-quality care. Using time per patient visit as a proxy for quality care, some researchers found that physicians react to increased competition by increasing the time spent per patient visit. Patients were also willing to pay more for longer time spent during visits. This result is attributable to improvements in the quality of care under competition rather than demand inducement. One study found that as the number of competing physicians increases in a given location, fees decline if quality is not controlled for. However, physicians reduce the time spent seeing Medicaid patients (substitution effect) when there is increased competition, while spending more time with the privately insured patients. In general, to survive in physician-dense areas, providers must deliver higher-quality care at higher fees and earnings per patient. This evidence is consistent with nonprice (quality) competition and does not necessarily reflect demand inducement.

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