Iron Triangle

The iron triangle is a metaphor for the strong and closed relationships between group representatives of specific interests, government bureaucrats, and politicians. Decisions made within this triangle dominate policymaking in a particular area. Iron triangles or subgovernments could especially be recognized in policymaking in the United States in the 1950s and 1960s. In the 1970s, juridical laws opened up the iron triangles by providing citizens and stakeholders access to the policy process. Policymaking was a process in which no longer three, but multiple actors participated, including environmental interest groups. In political science and public policy, iron triangles are considered to be a form of closed decision making of the past, but the term is sometimes still used to explain the hegemony of unsustainable practices, in spite of the availability of appropriate, sustainable alternatives and juridical means to enforce interest representation. Although environmental interest groups made abundant use of the opportunity to participate in policymaking, they have not always succeeded in influencing policies.

Iron triangles flourished in the United States in the two decades following World War II. Policies concerning a particular policy area, such as water, agriculture, public works, and defense, were made in closed communities consisting of three groups: (1) government [Page 251]bureaucrats in executive positions; (2) a legislative committee; and (3) a corporate interest group. The relationships between these groups were reciprocal and mutually enforcing. Members of Congress who were part of congressional committees or subcommittees had close relationships with the upper-level bureaucrats of the agencies that executed policies. The committees and subcommittees formulated these policies and granted the agencies budget for implementation. The executive agencies had considerable discretionary powers; programs that they had to implement were formulated in broad terms by Congress, and these agencies could influence the policy during implementation. Interest groups affected by the policy lobbied the committee and the agency to secure their interests. In return for a policy that favored their interests, they supported the policy as implemented by the agency and provided electoral support to the congressional committee members. The relationships between the upper-level bureaucrats and the interest groups were long-lasting and usually outlived the four or eight years in office of members of Congress. The closed, reciprocal, and continuing relationships provided stability to the policy process.