Intrinsic Value

Many people claim that nature has intrinsic value. Sometimes called inherent value or worth, intrinsic value falls within the philosophical domain of metaethics—the meaning and status of moral language. Although there can be confusion about what the term intrinsic value means, working through this confusion is central to projects in environmental ethics to address environmental problems.

Many people claim that values are wishy-washy, subjectively messy, and best left out of serious scientific and policy discussions about environmental issues. Values cannot be objectively measured and quantified, and value preferences seem to be no different than preferences for different flavors of ice cream. However, to claim that discussions about values are not valuable is itself a value claim. In a factual sense, science can only describe and explain what the environmental issues are and predict what might happen if such and such happens first. Science cannot tell us what we should or should not do. We must make ethical judgments that stem from our stated values, enter into dialogue with each other, and arrive at some form of intersubjective agreement about what to do about environmental problems. Values thus play a central role in the resolution of all environmental problems.

No one denies that nature has instrumental value for people. Nature consists of natural resources that can be consumed or used. But does nature also have intrinsic value? To address this question, philosopher Richard Routley devised a thought experiment that became known as the “last man argument.” In this thought experiment, Routley asks us to imagine an Earth where everyone has died except for one man. Before this man dies, he goes about eliminating animals (painlessly) and plants—every living thing he can. Has this last man done anything morally objectionable? If you answer no, then you supposedly subscribe to an anthropocentric (human-centered) environmental ethic in which the only kinds of things that have intrinsic, noninstrumental value are humans. If you answer yes, then you supposedly subscribe to a nonanthropocentric environmental ethic in which nonhuman nature (or parts of nonhuman nature) has intrinsic, noninstrumental value. [Page 249]Beyond anthropocentrism, where one locates intrinsic value determines the kind of environmental ethic to which one subscribes. If nonhuman animals have intrinsic value, this is what environmental philosophers call a zoocentric (zoology-centered) environmental ethic; this is sometimes called sentientism (focused on the capacity to experience pain and/or pleasure) or psychocentrism (centered on having a psychological makeup). If nonhuman animals and plants have intrinsic value, this is a biocentric (life-centered) environmental ethic. If holistic biological and ecological entities such as species and ecosystems have intrinsic value, this is an ecocentric (ecology-centered) environmental ethic.

Philosopher Dale Jamieson calls intrinsic value the “gold standard” of morality because what has intrinsic value has ultimate moral value. But what precisely is intrinsic value? It is commonly used in at least four different senses. First, intrinsic value can simply mean noninstrumental value. Something has instrumental value if it can be used for something else. That something else has intrinsic value. Thus, money has instrumental value for people who have intrinsic value.

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