Communicative Rationality

Communicative rationality characterizes a particular logic of interaction among individual (or collective) actors that is determined by argumentative processes. This differs from cases in which payoff structures constrain the strategic calculations of actors (e.g., trade negotiations) or situations where actors unquestioningly adhere to social norms. Communicative rationality occurs via an argumentative process, in which actors come to a mutual consensus on the most persuasive arguments. The implication that institutional factors can facilitate collective learning and noncoercive coordination links this concept to debates about current challenges (e.g., globalization) and to the problem-solving capacity and democratic legitimacy of contemporary governance systems. Thus, communicative rationality provides a framework for understanding—and evaluating the moral status of—the governance of political and social institutions, which may range from narrow (e.g., committee procedures) to broad in scope (e.g., political systems).

Communicative rationality evokes a procedural logic that is rooted in argumentative exchange between actors in a social setting. This logic is expressed in a collective learning process, in which certain arguments become mutually recognized as the most persuasive. Because persuasion trumps all other forms of influence, this procedural rationality is thought to be consensus oriented. Thus, even the use of dubious arguments for strategic goals does not inhibit the procedural logic from filtering out the better arguments.

The roots of this logic are captured by the concept of communicative action. Unlike other forms of social action (e.g., threats), communicative—or speech—acts entail (often implicitly) validity claims about the following: factual truths, a norm's applicability, and the communicator's truthfulness. Actors are assumed to have an intuitive grasp of the conditions that would objectively determine their claims' validity, and this opens them to being criticized on their own terms.

These features of communicative action represent latent communicative potential. Just as improving legal structures can unleash entrepreneurial innovation and competition, the following three ideal conditions are thought to encourage communicative action and rationality: (1) open access to the discussion, (2) willingness of actors to accept the most persuasive arguments, and (3) willingness of actors to back their claims with reasons and an openness to having them challenged. These conditions serve as conceptual benchmarks and, like perfect markets, are not necessary to evince the hypothesized logic.

Various implications can be anticipated from interactions that come comparatively close to these ideal conditions. First, situations characterized by communicative rationality are decidedly egalitarian because all sources of influence (i.e., force, majority rule, bargaining power, status) are subordinated to the persuasive power of the “best argument.” Second, unlike individualistic conceptualizations of cognitive learning, communicative rationality implies a form of social learning that can transform collective beliefs about how the world works (e.g., certain pollutants are lethal) or how norms should be applied to situations (e.g., civil rights should apply to all citizens). This hypothesized form of learning is a precursor to behavioral change and challenges the assumption that self-interest perceptions are unchanging. If empirically supported, it follows that institutional reforms to facilitate communicative rationality could reduce governance problems stemming from the appearance of irreconcilable interests.