Skip to main content icon/video/no-internet

The metaphor of “failed states” or “failing states” enjoys considerable popularity among commentators of global developments and policymakers alike, although both the concept and the reality of states thus described are contested. The debate on failed states started in the late 1990s in response to empirical observations made since the beginning of the decade on what is seen commonly as a loss of the monopoly of violence in the Weberian sense by states, often in an environment of violent conflict. This debate developed against the background of changes in the global order after the end of the Cold War, responses to the apparent decline of empirical statehood in sub-Saharan Africa and parts of the post-Soviet empire as well as increased international perceptions of threat and disorder.

Despite the occurrence of empirical observations at a global scale, the academic and political debate mainly focuses on Africa, namely, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Somalia, and the Democratic Republic of Congo (in some—misguided—cases this is even extended to cases of “bad governance” and gross human rights violations such as in Zimbabwe or Sudan). In failed or failing states, governments are challenged by armed groups, often with specific regional or transnational entanglements. These governments are losing control over large parts of state territory and are no longer able to perform key state functions such as the provision of public goods and security. In a limited number of cases, new forms of stateness have arisen from violent conflict. Somaliland and Puntland, which historically have been part of the independent state of Somalia that went into fully fledged civil war in 1990, are examples of this.

Academic Debate

The nature of the African state in particular has been questioned for some time. Among others, Robert Jackson and Carl Rosberg have focused on problems of limited forms of sovereignty, which they labeled quasi states—that is, those states which merely display symbols of stateness but do not enjoy their empirical substance. These states survived during the Cold War because the principles of international law protected their very existence (under sovereignty, territorial integrity, or noninterference). William Reno referred to these cases as “weak states.” But once the regime-stabilizing function of the Cold War had come to an end and the first violent conflicts developed in Africa, these states came under stress. Numerous authors tried to label these developments and, in doing so, gave meaning to the processes unfolding at that time. Some simply described their observations using the term state collapse or state failure. Others tried to develop a more analytical language and referred to processes of state inversion, state dysfunctionality, or state decay. From a more general, global perspective, which also takes into account developments in the Balkans and in the territories of the former Soviet Union, some authors imagined these developments as complex political emergencies or new wars—the latter pointing to an erosion of the state monopoly of violence, the rise of interstate wars (as opposed to intrastate wars), and the precedence of wars over questions of identity (rather than ideology). Concerning Africa, Christopher Clapham highlights the apparent existence of “degrees of statehood,” stopping short of developing a systematic typology. Gero Erdmann tries to close this gap when he combines territorial and functional variables to define three degrees of “incomplete stateness”: state failure, state decline, and state decay, the latter characterized by a partial or total loss of the monopoly of violence.

...

  • Loading...
locked icon

Sign in to access this content

Get a 30 day FREE TRIAL

  • Watch videos from a variety of sources bringing classroom topics to life
  • Read modern, diverse business cases
  • Explore hundreds of books and reference titles

Sage Recommends

We found other relevant content for you on other Sage platforms.

Loading