Cosmopolitanism

Classical Origins of the Concept

The theory of cosmopolitanism was developed during the pre-Hellenistic period (before 323 BCE). Materialist philosopher Demokritos (ca. 460 BCE to ca. 370 BCE) expressed the idea [Page 303]that the globe lies open to the sage and that the universe is the haven of good souls. Most significantly, the historical roots of cosmopolitanism lie in a much-quoted reply by Greek Cynic philosopher Diogenes of Sinope (ca. 412 BCE), who allegedly answered the question of where he came from with kosmopolitěs, a city embracing the world or as it has been interpreted, a citizen of the world. True citizenship was realized in cosmos, totality. There is an inbuilt tension in this reply insofar as the term combines the universality and harmony of natural order as represented by the kósmos with the particular and contested man-made order of society, the Greek city-state pólis. It remains uncertain whether the term in its original context referred to the cosmos of Greek civilization only or if it denoted an idea of universal humanity, also integrating the so-called barbarian, non-Greek cultures. The question relating to the potential universal applicability of norms and concepts developed within Europe remains heavily debated in the contemporary discourse (mainly in postcolonialism and critique of modernity).

Cosmopolitanism seems, however, to imply to cross narrowly defined territorial borders and to embrace universal space positively, uniting the individual rational being with a citizenship in the whole, a global consciousness. With the expansion of Hellenistic rule under Alexander (peaking in the period 323–146 BCE), followed later by the Roman Empire (27 BCE–476 CE), an all-embracing perception of humanity across space gained new significance. Roman emperor and Stoic Marcus Aurelius (120–181 CE) viewed logos and reason as universally perceivable categories of thought and deduced that there existed a shared human morality. In his eyes, this morality was the basis for a common law and hence all human beings were to be regarded as citizens in a common state, the world as a whole constituted one entity. For Marcus, the basis of philosophical reasoning was Stoicism, a philosophy embracing all humankind regardless of origin and societal rank, with strong features of recognition of a divine order and destiny, the control of passions with the ultimate goal of a balanced and virtuous lifestyle. Within stoic cosmopolitanism, the idea emerged that a human being has a dual identity, a personal and at the same time a universal, relating him to humankind with an ethical ideal of universal benefit to humanity. The proximity between Stoicism and Christianity in the Roman Empire might help explain why Christianity perceived itself as an all-embracing and universal religion, the original meaning of the word catholic. Christianity in its ideological essence refuses particularity; all humans are equal in Christ. Internal differentiation between nations was an invention of the organization of medieval church hierarchy. It fueled perceptions of territorial particularity that were taken into the ideological struggles of reformation. The Westphalian (post-1648) state order manifested these ideas of particularity, strengthened by discourses on natural law in which the autonomous position of the individual and its liberty and in extension the autonomy of the individual state are constitutive. Theories of climate were drawn on to explain differentiations between nations and political systems, which was developed into an entire doctrine by Montesquieu in his The Spirit of the Laws (1748). Climate theories in combination with humoral pathology cemented collective stereotyping, which remains a powerful figure of thought in contemporary discourse. As a consequence of the strengthening of individual states, 17th-century jurists like Hugo Grotius and Samuel Pufendorf identified the need for international law, regulating mutual relations between single states. But this tiny common bond between states was based only on the similarity of autonomy and its reciprocal recognition, not on a shared joint system of values.

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