Cooperation

Theoretical Models

Several scientific disciplines carry out research on cooperation and have established models for understanding it. Whereas biology focuses on symbiotic cellular processes or colony-forming insects, cultural and social studies deal with phenomena of interactions among individuals, among organizations and institutions, and among nations, on both a regional and a global level.

One of the most prominent approaches to human cooperation is outlined in Robert Axelrod's study on the evolution of cooperation. For his experiment, he invited internationally renowned scholars to propose solutions to an iterated interaction on the basis of the well-known prisoner's dilemma. The “tit for tat” strategy, where members of the group cooperate only with others who also cooperate and exclude those who do not, was the most successful.

Axelrod identified three necessary conditions for cooperation. First, the likelihood of meeting sometime in the future instills a basic level of accountability for actions taken: If there is no chance of future interaction, there are no repercussions for not cooperating. Second, the ability to identify one another also contributes to ensuring future accountability. Third and finally, a record of past behavior allows the individual actors to judge future behavior and determine whether cooperation will be [Page 289]beneficial. Axelrod thus concluded that cooperation portrays not only a successful method of goal-achievement without the need for prior agreements but also a very rational one.

In his study on the logic of collective action, Mancur Olson added another twist to these insights. Olson challenged the accepted wisdom that people will naturally act collectively to pursue common interests by identifying the “free rider” problem, under which individuals in a group will not cooperate when the group is seeking to provide public goods. A rational individual will join and contribute to a group only when the individual can gain a separate, private benefit reserved strictly for group members. In sum, without selective incentives for participation, cooperation is unlikely to take place even when the actors share common interests.

Another theoretical approach based on the analytical meso level that considers institutions and organizations is that of a commons. This ancient form of cooperation has experienced a renaissance in contemporary discourse. Propelled by the work of Nobel Laureate in economics Elinor Ostrom, the commons refers to resources that are collectively owned and are shared, used and managed cooperatively. These resources traditionally referred mainly to natural resources (e.g., land, forests, and rivers) but now extend to culture, public goods, such as education, and even knowledge and software (e.g., Creative Commons). This theoretical framework places issues such as global public goods and the global commons at center stage.

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