Skip to main content icon/video/no-internet

As an approach to macroeconomic reform in poor and middle-income countries, structural adjustment became a standard in lending programs of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank in the mid 1980s. As an idea, it encapsulates the so-called Washington Consensus among these institutions and the relevant departments of the U.S. government (e.g., the Treasury, the Agency for International Development), all based in Washington, D.C. Following major national defaults throughout the developing world in 1982, these lenders implemented stricter conditions for disbursing funds, requiring debtors to “adjust” the “structures” of their economies. Principally, this move entailed scaling back both state regulation of financial markets and subsidies for key industries (e.g., manufacturing) and utilities (e.g., communications, energy). The goal was to make indebted countries—in Latin America, Africa, parts of Asia, and eventually the former Soviet bloc—more economically dynamic and profitable and thus more capable of loan repayment. Such successful metamorphoses, however, have been fleeting (e.g., in The Gambia, Thailand, and Argentina).

Adjustment moved countries away from import-substitution industrialization and similar regimes, which had shielded domestic economies from foreign competition and ensconced state bureaucracies as key providers of extensive public goods, toward a neoliberal model of more globalized markets and a more entrepreneurial role for the state. Despite the aim of “adjusting” poorer economies to converge on an ideal of development, in many cases, this shift intensified the differences between countries, cities, and neighborhoods.

Reforms

Every program of structural adjustment is nationally specific because debtors must negotiate individually, rather than as a cartel, with the key international financial institutions. Each “adjustee” is further distinguished by its own population, resources, political legacy, and cultures. Nonetheless, there are general features of reform that transcend adjustment cases.

In finance and trade, the fundamental prescription has been liberalization: the partial or complete removal of barriers to transnational capital and goods. For financial markets, there is loosening of rules for foreign participation in domestic banks and stock markets. Currencies are also primary targets, typically opened to market fluctuation to create more transparent management but sometimes pegged to another marketized currency (e.g., the Argentine peso, fixed to the U.S. dollar from 1991 to 2001). Trade, on the other hand, is affected by dropping tariffs on imported goods, which had indirectly subsidized domestic producers. Simultaneously, reduction in direct government subsidies to indigenous industries ended the official monopolies or direct ownership by the state. There have been many cases of other curtailed subsidies on basic consumer goods, particularly food—an austerity that, although considered imperative in some adjustment programs, proved an extremely volatile reform across all world regions.

For the state itself, there are usually two major forms of restructuring. The first is privatization of state-owned enterprises, which tend to be concentrated in basic utilities, from the post office to railways to water supply to telephones. There are many cases where privatization brings greater efficiency and some improvements in access to these goods, but it also can lead to steep increases in prices because these companies must operate using market logic, with demand possibly far outstripping supply and competitiveness—not well-being—taking foremost priority. Another drawback of privatization is that it can fail to break effectively with former monopoly conditions; without sufficient oversight, lucrative holdings can be distributed nepotistically at prices far below the market value. This has notably been the case with certain national airlines and phone companies (e.g., Zambia, Argentina). The possibility of extensive foreign ownership of local utilities—often considered strategic resources and part of the national heritage—is a feature of privatization that many critics also lament. The second major transformation to the state is decentralization, which shifts some functional and fiscal responsibilities away from national-level bureaucracies to provincial or urban authorities. Reductions in bloated federal governments can result from this policy, but it has also backfired: Expensive redundancies can eventuate within state hierarchies, while sometimes local authorities gain new policy purviews and the right to set more independent agendas but without matching finances to realize them.

...

  • Loading...
locked icon

Sign in to access this content

Get a 30 day FREE TRIAL

  • Watch videos from a variety of sources bringing classroom topics to life
  • Read modern, diverse business cases
  • Explore hundreds of books and reference titles

Sage Recommends

We found other relevant content for you on other Sage platforms.

Loading