Ecological Justice

Conceptions of justice typically address notions of what is right and what is fair. Ecological justice addresses how humans relate with nonhuman species and the natural world. Sometimes called justice to nature, it seeks to delineate human's moral obligations to other species. This entry considers definitions, concepts, and issues central to ecological justice, which is different from environmental justice. The latter term refers to social justice environmentalism. Commentators attribute the term ecological justice to geographers Nicholas Low and Brendan Gleeson, but its scholarly antecedents date as far back as the mid 20th century, to Aldo Leopold's “land ethic” and Rachel Carson's Silent Spring, which sought to extend ethical behavior to biotic communities. As a research perspective, ecological justice recognizes that nature has intrinsic value and acknowledges the interconnections and mutual interdependence of all species. Proponents seek to expand the domain of “moral considerability” beyond humans to encompass animals, plants, and even inanimate objects such as rocks, rivers, and oceans.

There are several bases of ecological justice. Religious grounds often posit humans as custodians of the natural world and are founded on humans’ moral responsibility to other species, stemming from supernatural entities (God, Buddha, Allah, Australian Aboriginal Dreamtime beings, etc.). Instrumental grounds see current and future generations of humans as reliant on the natural world for their needs (e.g., food, medicine, and clothing). Without these species, humans may suffer extinction. More recently, some commentators have argued that humans have a kinship with nonhuman species, as fellow animals and “ecological citizens,” and are thus morally obliged to care for other species. In short, ecological justice seeks to reposition humans’ relationship with nature and to establish moral obligations to nonhuman entities.