Public Interest

The Public Interest in Political Philosophy

There is no settled view of the concept in political philosophy, much less in the sphere of its practical application to economic activity. The literature contains a host of typologies—systematic sortings by dimensions claimed to extract important aspects of the concept—that purport to distinguish key alternative meanings of the concept. The types distinguished are sometimes little more than lists, and the labels given to the types can seem arcane and somewhat distant from practical application. Here are some prominent examples: In 1955, Edward Banfield found “unitary” meanings (distinguishing “organismic” from “communalist”) and “individualistic” approaches (distinguishing “utilitarian,” “quasi-utilitarian,” and “qualified individualistic”). In 1957, Frank Sorauf distinguished alternative meanings: as commonly held value, as wise or superior interest, as moral imperative, as balance of interests, or as vague, essentially undefined value. In 1959, W. A. R. Leys and C. M. Perry found both formal meanings (simple or pluralistic) and substantive meanings (utilitarian, procedural, or normative). In 1960, Glendon Schubert identified “rationalist,” “idealist,” and “realist” types. In her 1970 book, Virginia Held divided the theories of the public interest into “preponderance” theories, “common interest” theories, and “unitary” theories. In 1974, Clarke Cochran listed “normative,” “abolitionist,” “process,” and “consensualist” types.

These typologies seem bewildering in number, and though in their authors' discussion they provide numerous, valuable insights concerning subtleties in the meanings of the public interest, they are often not very systematic in construction. The Sorauf, Schubert, and Cochran typologies are lists with no structure; the others sort the concept with varying, often incomplete logics.

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