Preferential Treatment

The term preferential treatment refers to forms of recruitment, appointment, hiring, and promotion that give preference to (members of) groups previously or presently affected by discrimination.

Preferential treatment is often called “affirmative action.” But whether the two terms are synonymous will depend on the narrowness or broadness of the definitions used.

The forms of discrimination that lead to policies of preferential treatment need not be intentional or rooted in racist or sexist attitudes. Discrimination is sometimes unintentional and connected to practices that have discriminatory effects. Hiring by personal friendships and word of mouth are common instances, as are some seniority systems. Advertising and interviewing only in certain geographical regions or at certain colleges may have the effect of excluding minorities from consideration for jobs. Even bias-free individuals may engage in selection procedures that have disproportionate and adverse effects on certain groups. Preferential treatment policies have been established to redress policies or practices that have had such discriminatory effects.

Preferential policies make the properties of race and sex morally relevant considerations, even though these properties should, under circumstances free of discrimination, be morally irrelevant. However, the reasons for using these properties in preferential policies are different from the role these properties play in invidious discrimination. Racial discrimination and sexual discrimination typically spring from feelings of superiority and a sense that other groups deserve lower social status. Preferential treatment entails no such attitude or intent. Its purpose is to restore to persons the status that they have been unjustifiably denied, help them escape stigmatization, and foster relationships of interconnectedness in society.

Preferential treatment can appear in the form of specific target goals or, in more subtle ways, of giving [Page 1656]special opportunities to minorities or women. Merely terminating discriminatory attitudes or practices does not constitute preferential treatment. To stop a policy of hiring by family connections or to terminate a seniority system might have the desired effect of ending discrimination, but it would not involve preferential treatment.

Preferential policies are often said to have their moral foundations in the principle of compensatory justice, which requires that if an injustice has been committed, just compensation or reparation is owed to the injured person(s). However, it has been disputed that any form of justice is adequate to justify policies of preferential treatment. It is generally agreed by all parties to the discussion that individuals injured by past discrimination are owed compensation as a matter of justice. However, controversy has arisen over whether past discrimination against groups such as women and minorities justifies preferential treatment for current group members. Critics of group preferential policies hold that only identifiable discrimination against individuals requires, and warrants, a policy of compensation; they argue that group preferential polices are unjust. Some supporters of preferential policies try to show that principles of justice do apply to groups, but other supporters appeal to social ideals and good social outcomes rather than principles of justice. Each of these three positions is considered below.

Those who claim that preferential compensatory measures are just, in the sense of required by justice, argue that past discrimination warrants present remedies, including preferential treatment of groups. Proponents note that the effects of discrimination linger. For example, African Americans whose families were victims of past discrimination may be handicapped by poverty and undereducated parents, whereas the families of past slave owners are still being unduly enriched by inheritance laws. On this account, those who have inherited wealth accumulated by iniquitous practices have no more right to their wealth than the sons of slaves, who have some claim to it as a matter of compensation. In the case of women, the argument is that cultural attitudes foster in women a lack of self-confidence and prejudicially exclude them from much of the domestic and international workforce or treat them as a low-paid auxiliary labor unit. Consequently, only highly independent women can be expected to compete with men on initially fair terms; and even these women may not be able to compete equally in the setting of multinational corporations having operations in many countries.

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