Nozick's Theory of Justice

In Anarchy, State, and Utopia, American philosopher Robert Nozick (1938–2002) develops an entitlement theory of justice, a libertarian theory of justice centered on individual inalienable rights (including, first and foremost, liberty). As an entitlement theory, it is concerned with the justice of what one has acquired. Nozick's entitlement theory has three elements—acquisition, transfers, and rectification—which are described in greater detail below.

Nozick's theory can be classified as historical and unpatterned. Broadly, Nozick constructs a typology of [Page 1528]theories of justice in which he distinguishes between historical and unhistorical (i.e., end state or current time slice) principles of distributive justice, as well as patterned and unpatterned principles. All four combinations of principles of distributive justice are possible, but Nozick defends his own historical unpatterned theory against the other three conceptualizations (or combinations). By history, he refers to past transactions, choices, or actions among individuals that may create or transfer entitlements over resources (which Nozick calls “holdings”). By pattern, he means a systematic variation of a distribution according to some natural dimension, weighted sum of natural dimensions, or some other ordering of natural dimensions. For example, a patterned principle may demand that total distributive shares vary directly with moral merit, usefulness to society, or intelligence.

Although Nozick opposes historical-patterned and unhistorical-unpatterned (random allocation) distributions of holdings, his most explicit opposition is to unhistorical-patterned principles of justice, which are set out, for example, in John Rawls's A Theory of Justice. According to Nozick, liberty will necessarily upset any pattern of distribution of goods (e.g., egalitarianism). Vice versa, maintaining patterns in any distribution of holdings requires continuous interference with individuals' choices and actions. However, any such interference requires individuals' free consent. With this requirement, Nozick highlights the importance of procedural justice in which individuals agree on several principles of how holdings can be acquired and transferred and how any injustice can be rectified. Based on an individualistic, rights-centered moral philosophy, historical principles of resource allocation take priority over end state (also known as end result or current time slice) principles of justice, which focus on the distributive outcomes of resource allocations but do not examine how these distributions of holdings have actually come about. Nozick's deontological stance—that individuals have rights and that there are things that no one may do to them without violating their rights—does not allow for any position other than historical-unpatterned principles of distributive justice. Its three main elements—justice in transfers, justice in acquisition, and compensatory justice—are summarized in the following sections.